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ABSTRACT

This study examines the decision making process in Washington which led to the current nonexistence of political and economic relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States.
The study examines the U.S.-Iran relationship at three levels-of-analysis: the individual, state, and
system levels.

From a geopolitical perspective, Iran and the United States have often been natural allies that
pursued similar policy goals. After 9/11, the U.S. entered Afghanistan and Iraq which further
necessitated the reengagement of Tehran. Iranian regional clout would play a vital role in stabilization of
Iraq and Afghanistan and without Iran’s assistance; peace will not likely be realized in those states.
Amongst the most compelling reasons for Washington to engage in meaningful dialogue with Tehran
are: terrorism, the war on drugs, the Iranian sponsorship of militant groups, and Tehran’s pursuit of a
nuclear program.

The study concludes that rapprochement should occur in two phases. The first being cooperation
in areas of mutual concern such as the war on drugs. The second phase promoting confidence building
methods, which would lead to a strategic partnership based on mutual interests.
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CHAPTER 1: MAIN ARGUMENT
Introduction
In the post-Cold War milieu, the United States has emerged as a global superpower with the
ability to impose its will globally with a modicum of impunity. Unfortunately, Washington has
occasionally prosecuted foreign policy undemocratically in that its endeavors are counter to the
democratic consensus of the international community. I shall examine Washington’s policy of
containment towards Iran and uncover how it is wholly inappropriate and a detriment to America’s
political effectiveness abroad; not only in Afghanistan and the broader Middle East but with its
European allies as well. This examination of Washington’s policies towards Iran will elucidate their
negative impact upon America’s endeavors, specifically within the surrounding regions. What I hope to
communicate clearly is that America’s current foreign policy towards Iran is indeed inappropriate and
how adjustments in Washington’s foreign policies toward Iran could enable the U.S. to realize a myriad
of important goals within the region. Washington cannot afford to ignore Iran or continue its policy of
containment towards it. The Islamic Republic of Iran is a country that is a shimmering geopolitical
jewel. Strategically situated on the Persian Gulf, Iran is one of the world's biggest oil producers through
which most Middle Eastern oil flows into international markets. Washington’s obstinacy has had the
effect of pushing Iran into a Sino-Russo orbit. As a result, China and Russia have successfully
maneuvered for influence in a post-Khomeini Iran and have been steadily negotiating for Iranian oil and
gas. 1
The tragedy of the current impasse in U.S. – Iranian relations is that despite a half a century of
intrigue and acrimony, the Iranian populace strongly admires American values, ingenuity and industrial
prowess. 2 In his book, The Eagle and the Lion, Iran scholar James A. Bill made note of a previous 100year period of positive U.S.-Iranian relations. In the early 1800’s American medical and teaching
missionaries traveled to Iran to provide educational support. He also details how Washington stood
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beside Iran during its campaign in the mid-1940’s to convince the Soviet Union to withdraw its military
presence stationed there during World War II. Iran had once looked favorably upon the U.S. as an ally
and a role model for the struggle against colonialism. Yet the following three decades occasioned a
dramatic shift in opinion resulting in the perception of the United States as an imperialist force.
Washington depended predominantly upon the brutal Shah Pahlavi’s assessments while neglecting overt
signs of civil unrest leading up to open rebellion. Sadly, the level of hatred for the U.S. unleashed by the
Khomeini revolution caught many in Washington completely by surprise. 3
However, the Iranian revolution, the establishment of an Islamic Republic, the seizure of the
U.S. embassy in Tehran, and the current state of affairs between Tehran and the Washington are all
outgrowths of a history of unjust foreign interference and manipulation of Iran by Washington.
Although Iran faces significant regional challenges, the United States stands as Iran’s foremost strategic
challenge. Its relations with Washington have been further exacerbated in recent times with the Bush
Administration routinely calling for yet another U.S. orchestrated “regime change” in Tehran. The
massive projection of American military might on the Iranian frontiers since September 11 has added
credence to Iran’s claims of being beset on all sides by the United States. 4 Despite its comedy of errors
in the Middle East Washington remains intensely involved in Middle Eastern affairs, seeking to
maintain its hegemonic influence and impose its will by force if necessary. As once stated by Michael
Hudson, a professor at the school of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “the United States
stands astride this unhappy region like a colossus; the dominant power over the Middle East.”5
Although the United States has legitimate reasons for involving itself in Middle Eastern affairs,
namely in the realm of energy exploitation, it has also questionably involved itself in matters ranging
from the projection of military might to regime change. Due to its hasty invasion and occupation of Iraq,
Washington has landed itself in the role of a foreign sovereign with all the duties and obligations
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attached to that office. Between Afghanistan and Iraq, Washington’s expanding role has also created an
uncomfortable fence of American influence around Iran that has understandably alarmed Tehran.
Certainly Washington would be equally alarmed if Iran penetrated Canada and Mexico economically
and politically while also patrolling the international waters of the coasts of U.S. littoral states. Regional
instability, challenges with energy exploitation endeavors, and soured U.S./Iran relations can certainly
be remedied by an adjustment in Washington’s policy towards Iran. It is axiomatic that U.S.
rapprochement with Iran would effect broad changes in the current political landscape and open
profitable avenues for energy exploitation. From the stabilization of Afghanistan and the volatile Persian
Gulf region to diminishing Sunni militancy, the United States and Iran at times find themselves uneasily
on the same side. Should the two antagonists ever manage to dismantle the “wall of mistrust” separating
the two governments, they would take a giant step toward creating a new and more stable Middle East. 6
Recent talks between Washington and Tehran established through Swiss intermediaries reveal that
pragmatism might possibly overcome ideology and end the protracted period of soured relations.
Switzerland has looked after U.S. interests in Tehran in the absence of formal diplomatic relations
between Tehran and Washington, which were severed after the 1979 Islamic Revolution.7 However
events unfold, Washington officials are surely attuned with the positive benefits associated with
normalized relations with Iran. In the words of G. John Ikenberry, Political Science professor at the
University of Pennsylvania, “America is not adrift in uncharted seas: it is at the center of a world of its
own making.” 8
This piece is not a suggestion that Washington should make any concessions that are of a
detriment to American national security interests, domestically or abroad. It is equally not a suggestion
that the Islamic government in Iran does not have major changes to make with regard to its internal and
external practices. However, it does suggest that Washington must assume a leading role on the world
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stage by taking the initiative to end the current diplomatic chill between Iran and the United States.
There are adjustments that could be made in American foreign policy towards Iran which could
conceivably occasion moderation in Tehran. This is a notion recently underscored by Representative
Gary L. Ackerman in his statement before the Congressional Subcommittee on the Middle East and
South Asia:
“We are in Iraq largely because we, as a nation, didn’t think. We can’t afford to make the same
mistake twice. To face the challenge from Iran we must start by learning and questioning. What are Iran’s
strategic aspirations? Who controls Iran’s foreign policy? Are there schisms and weaknesses in Iran’s
political system that we can exploit? How do Iran’s leaders see their country’s place in the world, and
what does that imply about our ability to affect its foreign policy choices? What’s behind the rhetoric—
especially the threats to Israel and the repellent Holocaust denial? Who controls the balance between
ideology and realpolitik in Iranian security policy?”
In his closing sentence, Representative Ackerman quoted American diplomat and deputy head of
the U.S. mission in Moscow in the mid 1940’s. This statement stands as timeless advice, completely
relevant to the suggestions in this policy piece as they apply to Washington’s current endeavors in the
Middle East:
“We must have the courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of
human society. . . . The greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem . . . is that we shall
allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.” 9

Iran and the U.S. – Revolutionary Cousins
A salient reality confronts all those who endeavor to examine the similarities between Iran and
the United States. In the course of doing so, one discovers the two could be considered revolutionary
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cousins; mutineer leaves from the same tree of insurrection. Clearly Iran and the U.S. are at different
developmental stages. However a comparison can be made making general observations during the
course of their developmental stages. Both similarly rebelled and successfully threw off what they
perceived to be injudicious foreign manipulation. During their nascent independence, both countries
were characterized by secular nationalism. It was only after the Iranian revolution that religious forces
subsequently took control of Iran. It is also an inaccurate notion that regnant Anti-American sentiment in
Iran was fomented solely on the basis of Islamic dogma. Anti-Americanism was also trenchant among
the secular middle and upper classes who harbored no particular fondness of the Iranian clerics.
Surprisingly, anti-American sentiment was also prevalent among many devout Iranians who ironically
opposed the clerical leadership of Iran. Much like the United States, although guided by different
cultural and religious structures, the Iranian revolution was the manifestation of a frustrated and
demoralized population. Akin to the American colonists, the Iranians rebelled against a repressive
government that allowed its citizens no influence in policies that affected them directly; or access to
viable avenues for redress of grievances. 10
During the course of the revolution, as well as in its wake, Khomeini rose to prominence as
George Washington and Abraham Lincoln did in the early phases of the American republic. In America
Washington emerged as the fearless warrior who liberated the nation from tyranny, establishing
democratic institutions for posterity. His legacy was also that of isolationism – an America for
Americans. Lincoln safeguarded the integrity of the American nation-state by cleansing the country of
improper practices, such as the subjugation of human beings for profit. In doing so Lincoln became an
immutable historical figure as it applies to the American scheme of freedom. Lincoln additionally
demonstrated a profound willingness to prosecute war in the defense of American ideals. Both figures
remain indelible models for American leadership whose mythic qualities have been routinely mimicked
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by political figures across American history. 11 Like Washington and Lincoln, Khomeini emerged as
strikingly different type of Iranian leader; a key figurehead in Iranian history. Stoic and inflexible,
Khomeini had powerful convictions and soaring confidence in his spiritual stature. His noteworthy
brilliance and clear sense of destiny, not only for himself but for Iran, enabled him to command respect
from his countrymen. Khomeini harnessed the power of Shi’a lore and imagery, which enabled him to
seize control of Iran and lay claim to its very soul. Much like the framers did with American democracy
and the rule of law, Khomeini made Islamic fundamentalism a political force that would change Muslim
politics from Morocco to Malaysia. Similarly, Khomeini only became a revolutionary figure in reaction
to external policies that had, in his mind, negative effects within Iran. Both America and Iran also share
the misfortune of having been victims of European commercial and political pressures. The tentacles of
colonialist influence threatened both counties by subjugating them economically and denying them a
well-founded sense of political efficacy. Both Iranian and early Americans revolutionaries battled for
their independence with their endeavors bulwarked by charismatic ideologues who rose in defense of
certain inalienable rights and, above all, their national interests. 12
Finally, both America and Iran have not hesitated to provide funding and material support during
the course of endeavors to export their respective revolutionary ideals. This practice has predominantly
been driven by a desire to expand their sphere of ideological influence not only regionally but abroad as
well. Washington has routinely lambasted Tehran for its material support of Islamic organizations such
as Hezbollah, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Despite their negative images, it is undeniable
that these Islamic organizations are regionally reactionary and outgrowths of what is perceived to be
foreign interference. In essence, Tehran’s ideological and material support of revolutionary groups is no
different than that of Washington’s in reaction to Communism’s influence and perceived Soviet
penetration into Latin America.
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In Guatemala’s 1950 democratic elections, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman was elected to power with
65% of the popular vote. Arbenz was a reformer who made it no secret that he intended to improve
living conditions for the nation’s destitute majority. Arbenz was ultimately perceived as a threat by the
Eisenhower Administration due to his proposed leftist social reforms. In the United States McCarthyism
had fomented an intense anti-Communism hysteria and this did not bode well for Arbenz who allowed
the local Communist Party to operate openly. Despite the positive benefits for his country’s poor
citizenry, Arbenz’s land reform program represented a looming threat to the commercial interests of an
American-based multinational corporation, the United Fruit Company (UFC). The UFC was
Guatemala's largest landowner and a majority of its holdings were vulnerable to Arbenz's reform plans.
During the course of calculating its tax obligations, the UFC had purposefully undervalued the worth of
its holdings by claiming its land holdings were only worth $3 per acre. When, during the course of the
land reform initiative, the Arbenz government offered to compensate the UFC at the declared rate the
UFC argued the land's true value was $75 per acre, unable to explain the precipitous jump in its own
determination of the land's value. The UFC’s close ties to the U.S. government and Arbenz’s potential
communist ties ultimately enabled the UFC to appeal successfully to the Eisenhower Whitehouse. In the
years following Arbenz’s election, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) trained and sponsored a
Guatemalan military force to remove him from power. The U.S. sponsored operation succeeded in mid1954, deposing the democratic government and replacing it with a military junta. The CIA coup ushered
in an era of torture, repression, and state terrorism that took the lives of close to two hundred thousand
Guatemalans. In 1960 the new government authorized the CIA to operate in Guatemala to train Cuban
exiles for the Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba. Additionally, State terror escalated to genocide in the 1980s
as entire Mayan communities were wiped out with the active connivance of the Reagan Administration,
according to the findings in 1999 of a United Nations sponsored truth commission. 13 Due to the U.S.
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sponsored manipulation of Guatemala the country has never been the same. Its milieu of internecine
conflict has been further exacerbated by numerous natural disasters in the region. Currently, Guatemala
is characterized by a small ruling aristocracy, which possesses a majority of the country’s wealth while
its poor populace labors for survival. By no stretch of imagination, it is evident that U.S. government
officials sponsored terrorism in Guatemala by virtue of the provision of arms, training, diplomatic cover,
and intelligence.
In 1979 a left-wing revolutionary group, called the Sandinistas, toppled the Somoza dictatorship
in Nicaragua. The group was named after a Nicaraguan revolutionary leader – Augusto Cesár Sandino.
Soon after taking office in 1981, President Ronald Reagan authorized the CIA to secretly fund and equip
the Contras. The Contras were mostly former members of the Somoza military who sought the
overthrow of the Sandinista government and operated from bases in Honduras and Costa Rica. The
Reagan Administration intervened on the basis of confronting “the Cuban presence and
Cuban-Sandinista support structure in Nicaragua and elsewhere in Central America.” The CIA’s
controversial actions in South America, which included the mining of Nicaragua's harbors in the mid
1980’s, resulted in the promulgation of the Boland amendment. This congressional law prohibited the
sponsorship of military operations in Nicaragua, a practice commonly engaged in by U.S. Intelligence
agencies. Despite the unlawful nature of supporting the Contra rebels, President Reagan gave orders to
preserve the integrity of Contra resistance, “body and soul.” It was then that the National Security
Council (NSC) assumed operational control; an endeavor previously orchestrated by the CIA. Although
the activities were proscribed, President Reagan and U.S. officials continued to ensure that aid flowed to
the Contras; the bulk emanating from private sources and third party states such as Brunei, South Africa,
and Saudi Arabia. The clandestine operation was bulwarked by air support, secure communications, and
Swiss bank accounts. Operating under the code name “the Enterprise”, this illegal organization was
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overseen by Marine Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North who was at the time an aide to the National
Security Council. The operation was conducted with the tacit approval of Colonel North’s superiors,
National Security Advisers Robert McFarlane and John Poindexter, and CIA director William Casey.
Comprised of business people and former intelligence and military officials, this apparatus operated in
secret and outside the realm of congressional oversight. In order to garner sympathy for the Contras,
who were purportedly on their heels due to the congressional cutoff, the Reagan Administration also
engaged in illicit propaganda campaigns in hopes of swaying congressional votes in favor of
intervention. 14 The actions of the Reagan Administration became publicly known in November 1986.
Investigations by a presidentially appointed panel and a joint committee of Congress focused on whether
or not Reagan knew about or had authorized the diversion, and whether Congress's constitutional foreign
policy and budget prerogatives as well as U.S. laws had been violated. An independent counsel
investigated the legality of third-country fund-raising for projects banned by Congress, as well as the
obstruction of justice by administration officials. It was ultimately determined there had been “secrecy,
deception, and disdain for the law,” but that President Reagan had not broken the law. Nearly a dozen
senior administration officials and private citizens were convicted of crimes. However all convicted U.S.
officials, as well as those awaiting trial, were pardoned in December 1992 by President George H. Bush.
Much like the CIA-organized invasion of the Bay of Pigs in Cuba in 1961, the American fingerprint in
Nicaragua left an indelible stain on American credibility. Officials at the highest level had been exposed
for organizing international terrorism, violating U.S. law, and lying under oath. Sadly, the central figures
in the controversy later enjoyed high-profile careers in both the public and private sectors. 15
During the course of American intervention in South America, presidential administrations have
gone so far as to portray the enabled elements as “freedom fighters.” In most cases, the so-called
“freedom fighters” engaged in wide-scale atrocities against the civilian population with the tacit
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approval of Washington. When examined objectively, the freedom fighters are analogous to terrorists
who are far worse than the elements they seek to displace. When successful, such as in Guatemala, the
enabled parties establish repressive dictatorships that enjoy Washington’s largesse as long as private
elements or certain governmental agencies are given free reign to operate within their borders.
Ironically, for engaging in the same practice, Tehran has been characterized by Washington as a
“sponsor of terrorism”.
This objective comparison reveals that much like American foreign policy, Iranian sponsorship
of external revolutionary elements has been wholly reactionary. The notion of appropriateness is not as
relevant to this argument as the rationale for the sponsorship. It is the penetration and expansion of
unfavorable ideological elements, which is the basis for the sponsorship of rebel proxies. As
revolutionary cousins, Iran and the United States are no strangers to the notion of aiding rebel
movements in their struggles against threats that are ideological in nature. However it is a practice that
has also encumbered them with the yoke of escalating commitments, ultimately entangling both Tehran
and Washington in labyrinthine regional imbroglios.

Thesis Methodology
This paper will justify the necessity for U.S. / Iranian rapprochement via a “Waltzian”
examination of relations at the individual, state and system levels. A well known scholar in the field of
political science, Kenneth Waltz posited the notion of categorizing theories of international relations into
three “images”, or “levels of analysis”. In his book, “Man, the State, and War”, the procedure stresses
the significance of each image during the examination of global politics. The first image, or individual
level, deals with human nature, which Waltz suggests has great bearing upon the nature of relations
between states. The second image, or state level, is analogous to the first in that Waltz suggests that
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defects in states cause war among them. The third image, or system level, characterizes the international
system as anarchical due to the lack of a supreme governing body. According to Waltz, conflict can
occur because there no overall authority designated to prevent it. 16
Although weak in theory and optimistic, this paper is primarily a policy piece that examines the
issues from a cost benefit analysis perspective. During the course of objective examination and rational
argumentation this paper will elucidate how Washington has failed to fully capitalize on many avenues
for rapprochement and how simple adjustments in American foreign policy would still substantially
benefit both actors. This researcher not only relied upon scholarly research but also research abroad. The
rationale for the suggested American foreign policy change will be additionally supported by personal
experiences and interviews of Iranian citizens conducted during the course of field research within the
Islamic Republic of Iran.

Individual Level Introduction
The relations between leaders (individual level) have been the primary stumbling block to
normalized relations with Iran. Washington’s failures in this area emanate primarily from ideological
misunderstandings coupled with a failure to capitalize upon subtle hints aimed at the establishment of
diplomatic relations. Like the United States, Iran is a country characterized by pride and defiance;
governed by competing centers of power. Its elected elements such as the President and its parliament
(the Majles) are subordinate to appointed clerical leadership; the Supreme Council lead by the Supreme
Leader (Grand Ayatollah). The Supreme Leader constitutionally controls the Iranian armed forces and
crafts Iranian foreign policy. Iran’s theocratic political culture causes power and influence in Iran to
remain in a constant state of flux. For this reason, presidential administrations have routinely found Iran
quite difficult to comprehend. Whether or not it may be the case, Washington’s understanding of Iran
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has routinely appeared somewhat rudimentary. Additionally, the absence of economic ties and
diplomatic relations for over 25 years has fomented apprehension on both sides with regard to the
other’s motives. Simply stated, Washington and Tehran have become increasingly alien to one another
and their lack of engagement has occasioned growing state of a misperception and unnecessary bellicose
rhetoric from both sides.
In his book, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, the perspective of Robert
Jervis underscores the previous paragraph. Jervis examines the psychology of leaders and hazards of
foreign policymaking in an environment characterized by cognitive bias, inadequate information, and
stressful conditions. For Jervis, misperception commonly emanates from the failure of one actor to
realize their capacity to provoke a hostile reaction from the other. Application of Jervis’ philosophy to
this situation would suggest that Washington misreads Iran’s penetration into its neighboring states as
hostile rather than what might possibly have been part of its legitimate and longstanding diplomatic
interaction with neighboring elements. As a result, Washington continues to operate under cognitive
biases which compel its leaders to value certain types of information more than others, even if from an
unreliable source. 17 If this current diplomatic chill is in fact caused by misperception, it is self evident
that a policy change on the part of either actor would serve to re-establish productive diplomatic
relations. Examination of the matter at the individual level will reveal Washington could break the cycle
of hostility by taking the initiative to engage Iran directly. In doing so Washington could conceivably
acquire Tehran’s commitment to constructive policies toward important regional issues; namely
Afghanistan and Iraq.
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State Level Introduction
Examination of the issue at the state level focuses upon how Islamic terrorism is viewed by both
countries. The alleged exportation of Iranian revolutionary ideals as well as Iranian nuclear development
are also analyzed as state level issues. It is evident that criticism of Teheran from Washington centers
upon its alleged sponsorship of terrorism, its supposed endeavor to expand itself ideologically across the
region, and its nuclear program. Though the international community is not unjustified in being alarmed
with regard to these matters, Washington has clearly demonstrated double standards within the region as
it applies to counterterrorism, ideological exportation, and nonproliferation. The chapter notes that from
the outset of the U.S. led war on terror how Iran overtly demonstrated its willingness to confront radical
regional elements. The confrontation of radicalism in this region is an endeavor where both sides are
natural allies. The argument highlights Iranian antipathy towards al-Qaeda and how Tehran welcomed
the notion of the U.S. military putting al-Qaeda elements to rout in Afghanistan. It is axiomatic that alQaeda is ideologically at odds with Iran on this basis of its Shi’a Islam, which al-Qaeda figureheads and
its Sunni base perceive as heretical. Also examined is Washington’s enmity towards Iran with regard to
its alleged subversion and terrorism beyond its borders by virtue of the exportation of its revolutionary
ideology. In the wake of its Islamic revolution, Iran evidently sought to expand itself ideologically
however this endeavor proved to be ephemeral. Domestic and external threats soon commanded the
attention of Iran’s leaders. Homogeneity also represents a road block to Iranian ideological expansion.
Shi’a Iran is culturally and religiously distinct from the majority of the Middle East, where Sunni Arabs
are regionally hegemonic. For this reason, the inseparable elements of Shi’a Islam within the Iranian
theocratic model will always deter Middle Eastern states and countries abroad from attempting to
emulate its Islamic revolution. Examination of Iranian sponsorship will reveal that Washington’s
rhetoric with regard to hostile Iranian machinations in the Middle East and beyond is without merit. The
chapter ends with examination of the Iranian nuclear issue, particularly Washington’s current hysteria
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with regard to Tehran’s legitimate nuclear intentions. These fears are evidently ignorant to the reality
that, from the Eisenhower Administration through the Carter years, the U.S. was a major benefactor in
the constitution of Iran’s nuclear program with the United States and Iran entering into a civil nuclear
cooperation agreement in 1957. Over the following 20 years, that agreement was followed by technical
assistance as well as an experimental nuclear reactor with enriched uranium and plutonium with fissile
isotopes. Examination of this matter will elucidate Washington’s double standards and unwarranted
obsession with the supposed nuclear intentions of an adversary while at the same time turning a blind
eye to the proven nuclear arsenals of Israel, Pakistan, and India. Pakistan and Israel both possess nuclear
weapons and sophisticated delivery systems with Israel capable of striking against Iran with its longrange nuclear missiles in a matter of minutes. Unlike Iran, neither Israel nor Pakistan have participated
as signatory powers to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Ironically, both are in violation of UN
Security Council resolutions regarding their nuclear weapons programs yet Washington does not hold
the same alarmist view towards countries that are actually in defiance of UN Security Council
resolutions. 18

System Level Introduction
During the course of system level analysis, this paper will examine instances where Washington
and Tehran’s interests converge; specifically in Afghanistan, Iraq and the war on drugs. Suggested is a
direct dialogue with Iran specifically regarding Afghanistan and Iraq for the purpose of regional
stabilization. Iranian involvement would greatly enhance the process of consolidating authority within
the central governments of both Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the rebuilding of their respective
economies. Engaging Tehran with a willingness to work diplomatically in areas of common interests
would substantially enable Washington to curb Iranian domestic and regional policies that Washington
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finds to be objectionable. By selectively engaging Iran on issues where U.S. and Iranian interests
converge, Washington would inevitably establish a productive political dialogue with Iran. It will be
demonstrated how an adjustment in American foreign policy would increase Washington’s efficacy by
arming it with Iran’s cultural, political, and religious clout. In addition, such dialogue would likely
enable both parties to resolve deep differences over Tehran’s nuclear ambitions and involvement in
regional conflicts. It will reveal that the continued containment of Iran only impedes regional stability,
does nothing to stem the flow of opium, and strengthens the hand of extremists who encourage
confrontation with American forces. In closing the chapter ends with examination of the Pasdaran; the
most ideologically committed arm of the Islamic regime. It will be demonstrated that by lumping
together all aspects of the Pasdaran under the generic cognomen of a “terrorist organization”,
Washington has severely disadvantaged itself. In the case of the Pasdaran, Washington is dealing with
an element of Iran whose hierarchy is characterized by a heterogeneous group of clerics, politicians and
social climbers. The ascendancy of the Pasdaran, economically, militarily, and politically, should be
widely perceived as a backlash against a failing American lead endeavor to contain Iran. Washington’s
bellicose rhetoric, such as calls for regime change, has clearly occasioned a conservative reentrenchment and a new leadership that has systematically rolled back domestic freedoms and deepened
its control over the Iranian populace. The Pasdaran’s tentacles are seemingly omnipresent yet despite its
rigid ideological components, many Iranians have political and economic stakes in maintaining and
defending the current regime. Suggested will be pragmatic methods in which the Pasdaran maybe be
approached in order to compel a majority of its elements to side with the populace against the rigidity of
the ruling regime.
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CHAPTER 2: INDIVIDUAL LEVEL EXAMINATION – RELATIONS BETWEEN
LEADERS
Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was the Shah of Iran after the Soviet Union, a country that had
invaded Iran during the course of World War II, pressured his father to abdicate in 1941. American
administrations held the view that the Shah of Iran was one of Washington’s most dependable pro-West
leaders in the Middle East. Positive congress with Tehran was a top priority among U.S. policymakers,
who concurred on Iran's strategic significance and concerned themselves with events or matters that
might destabilize Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi's regime. In 1955 the Shah was one of the signatories
of the Baghdad Pact which united the "northern tier" countries. The Baghdad Pact was a defensive
organization for promoting shared political, military and economic goals. Founded by Turkey, Iraq,
Great Britain, Pakistan and Iran the organization was similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Its main purpose was to deter communist incursions and foster peace in the Middle East. When Iraq
ended its involvement in 1959, the organization was renamed to the “Central Treaty Organization”, or
CENTO. 19 Coupled with the Saud monarchy in Saudi Arabia, the Pahlavi regime in Iran was the
linchpin in the United States "twin-pillar" policy in the Middle East—a policy that had brought both
countries into prominence as being critical to Western interests prior to the Iranian revolution. 20
Ironically, U.S. and British efforts to assure Pahlavi’s hegemony and to modernize Iran ultimately
contributed to his downfall.
During his first year in office, Eisenhower authorized the CIA to deal with a problem in Iran that
had begun during Truman’s presidency. In 1951, the Iranian parliament nationalized the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company, a British corporation that controlled the nation’s petroleum industry. The British
retaliated with economic pressure that created havoc with Iran’s finances, but Prime Minister
Mohammed Mossadeq refused to yield. Eisenhower worried about Mossadeq’s willingness to cooperate

16

with Iranian Communists; he also feared that Mossadeq would eventually undermine the power of Shah
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, a staunch anti-Communist partner. In August 1953, the CIA helped
overthrow Mossadeq’s government and restore the shah’s power. In the aftermath of this covert action,
new arrangements gave U.S. corporations an equal share with the British in the Iranian oil industry. 21
Following the Eisenhower and Kennedy commitments to Shah Pahlavi and to the Saudis, the
Johnson Administration had pressed the Iranian monarch to carry out reforms—land redistribution,
greater freedoms and rights for women and rapid improvements in education. These programs, it was
felt, had to accompany Iran’s rapid drive for industrialization and military strength. The only real
tension between the two countries was the Shah's seemingly insatiable desire for a modern and larger
military apparatus. His insistence on spending more of Iran's growing oil revenues on military
armaments conflicted with U.S. policy goals of advocating Iranian economic development and reform as
a check against internal upheaval or revolution. The Shah’s power was known to be autocratic and at
times arbitrary, nevertheless the monarch was seen as personally stable and generally enlightened if, at
times, solitary and somewhat insecure. The fact that he made all the major decisions himself—was
emperor, de facto prime minister, and commander in chief of the armed forces, as well as
knowledgeable and supportive of SAVAK’s internal security activities—was taken into account. 22 At
one time the Shah was in negotiations to purchase arms from the Soviet Union, however Washington
cautioned him there would be an adverse U.S. reaction. Ultimately, the Shah acquiesced to diplomatic
pressure assuring Washington that he would not purchase sophisticated military equipment from the
Soviet Union. In May 1968 President Johnson approved a 6-year, $600 million military credit sales
package for Iran. As the Johnson Administration drew to a close, an inter-agency review concluded that
the United States should continue to plan on the basis of $100 million in annual U.S. military credits to
Iran. Military cooperation with Iran would continue to be a very high priority. 23 The overall strategic
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value of Iran and the Shah to the United States was appreciated by every American administration from
Eisenhower through Ford. President Nixon had gone farthest, encouraging the Shah to cast himself in
the role of regional policeman. Because of Iran’s strategic significance, the Nixon and Ford
Administrations allowed the Shah to acquire virtually unlimited quantities of any non-nuclear weapons
in the American arsenal. 24
During the Arab oil embargos of 1967 and 1973 the Shah continued to export oil to the U.S.,
actually doubling its exports in 1974. 25 From 1951 into the 1970’s, Iran recognized Israel as a state and
the two ultimately became strategic partners. This partnership had four main components: Iranian
assistance for the immigration operations for Jews from Iraq; Israeli-Iranian cooperation in the area of
intelligence; agreements for military cooperation; and the supply of Iranian oil to Israel. 26
In the summer of 1967, Harold Wilson's Government announced the withdrawal of British forces
from “East of Suez”, a promise honored in 1971. 27 Prior to the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, the perception
of Iran as the main protector of Gulf security was reinforced by the American reluctance to fill the
power vacuum left by Britain as a result of its decision to withdraw its forces from the area "East of
Suez," including the Persian Gulf. Iran took Great Britain's place as the military power that guaranteed
stability in the Persian Gulf. 28 Rather than replace the British presence “East of Suez” to secure shipping
lanes with a direct American presence, the United States chose to rely on local powers, primarily Iran
and Saudi Arabia, to provide Persian Gulf security.
Becoming the regional gendarme of the Middle East required a massive investment in modern
military equipment and a substantial amount of American consultants to support the highly sophisticated
equipment for Iran’s military, which was comprised of unskilled and under-educated personnel. A clash
of cultures emerged and subsequently antagonized the general Iranian populace. Resentment over the
amount of Iranian oil revenues flowing to the United States and European countries concurrently
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fomented resentment against the West. Additionally, Pahlavi’s regime became increasingly and
egregiously corrupt. To counter rising discontent, Shah Pahlavi unleashed his security forces (SAVAK)
to seek out and halt the dissidents. Subsequently, serious human rights issues ensued that further
alienated the Iranian regime from its own subjects.
The election of Jimmy Carter as president of the United States in 1976 can be characterized as a
turning point in U.S.-Iranian relations. Known for his vocal emphasis on the importance of human rights
in international affairs, Carter made a plethora of demands upon the Shah, threatening to withhold
military and social aid if he didn’t comply. Carter pressured the Shah to release "political prisoners,"
whose ranks included radical fundamentalists, communists and terrorists. 29 Responding to Carter, the
Pahlavi regime released hundreds of political prisoners. The termination of dissident repression is said
to have encouraged the Shah's opponents. Some have come to view this pressure on the Shah and
Carter's unwillingness to allow Pahlavi’s to squelch radical dissent as the impetus for Pahlavi’s
downfall.
Revolution ensued in 1978, fueled by the acrimonious sermons and lectures of aged
fundamentalist cleric Ruhollah Khomeini, one of the Grand Ayatollahs of Shi’ite Islam. Between 1962
and 1963 Khomeini had spoken out against the shah's reduction of religious estates in a land-reform
program and against the emancipation of women. His ensuing arrest sparked anti-government riots and
after being imprisoned for a year Khomeini was forcibly exiled from Iran in November 1964. 30
Khomeini fomented rebellion from abroad, capitalizing on Pahlavi’s history of harsh repression and
attempts to modernize Iran. When Pahlavi was unable to totally comply with the Carter Administration's
and British demands, the Carter Administration ordered the Central Intelligence Agency to terminate $4
million per year in funding to religious Mullahs. Subsequently they became outspoken and vehement
opponents of the Shah. Despite his granting of free and democratic elections Pahlavi was unable to
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prevent an extremely volatile environment in Iran. The lack of U.S. support, coupled with angry
Mullahs, left Pahlavi in a precarious position. Shah Pahlavi capitulated early and, under the guise of
going on vacation, fled into exile. The provisional government he left behind collapsed soon thereafter
and Khomeini returned triumphantly to Tehran where he was greeted by millions of Iranians filling the
streets. 31

Shah Ruhollah Khomeini
President Carter’s Term
Trade between Iran and the United States prospered before the 1979 revolution. In 1978,
American products accounted for $4 billion (approximately 21%) of all Iranian imports. The United
States at that time was Iran's number-one trading partner. 32 Following Khomeini’s return the Carter
Administration scrambled to assure the new regime that the United States would maintain diplomatic ties
with Iran. 33 To symbolize support for Iran’s clerics, President Carter initially rejected a visa application
for exiled Shah Pahlavi to travel to New York for medical treatment. In late October, shortly before the
assault on the embassy, the head of the State Department's Iran Desk – Henry Precht – arrived in Tehran
for a ten-day visit with intentions of improving and normalizing diplomatic relation between Washington
and the new regime in Tehran. 34 Around the same time frame Shah Pahlavi’s medical condition
worsened. On October 22, President Carter changed his position and allowed Pahlavi to enter the United
States explicitly for medical treatment. Pahlavi was admitted to the New York Hospital on October 23,
1979 and the initial reaction to this was deceptively mild. 35 On November 1, 1979, Iranian foreign
minister Ibrahim Yazdi met with Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Jimmy Carter's national security
advisor, in Algiers to discuss resumption of relations. At the meeting, Brzezinski invited the new Iranian
regime to enter into a strategic partnership with the United States. For the most part the offer was
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enthusiastically received. However, Pahlavi’s entry to the United States was a catalyst for a strident wave
of anti-American protest, which swiftly drowned out the tentative protests of Iran’s unemployed
populace. Khomeini moved to harness the protesters anger over the Shah's entrance into the United States
for medical treatment. On November 1, 1979 a communiqué from Khomeini was broadcast over the state
controlled radio reminding Iranians that November 4th was the first anniversary of bloody anti-Shah
demonstrations at the University of Tehran. Khomeini posited that in the absence of Pahlavi all of Iran’s
problems emanated from the United States. Khomeini appealed to the student population to protest and to
focus all their anger and energy against the United States and Israel in order to compel the United States
to return the deposed Shah. It was clear that Khomeini was seeking to establish his authority over Iran's
unruly student population. Iran’s younger population represented a large segment of the populace, which
had been radicalized by the revolution. Yet it is uncertain whether he directly ordered the attack on the
embassy or merely accommodated himself to a fait accompli engineered by overzealous followers. 36
Three days later, Iranian students attacked the U.S. embassy in Tehran, taking fifty-two diplomats
hostage. 37 In his book, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis, David Houghton posits several
possible causes such as radical ideology, the utilization of American hostages as bargaining chips for
Shah Pahlavi, or to prevent Washington from engineering a counter-revolution. The circumstances
suggest, as asserted by Houghton, the hostage-takers most likely sought to prevent another clandestine
endeavor by the West to re-install Shah Pahlavi as a puppet dictator. 38
After the hostage seizure, Khomeini was concerned about the possibility of the United States
taking strong military and political action against his still fragile regime. Khomeini’s initial response to
the takeover was to order that the students be chased off the grounds. However he reconsidered when he
heard reports of its popularity. 39 Rather than assuming a firm position, Khomeini played a double game
for several days while carefully gauging Washington’s reaction. Khomeini’s late son Ahmad, who had
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been asked to coordinate with those who raided the U.S. embassy, later conceded that Khomeini
genuinely feared "thunder and lightning" from Washington. Conversely, Carter responded with a series
of polite requests asking for the release of the American hostages on humanitarian grounds. 40
President Carter’s response involved the dispatching of Ramsey Clark and William Miller to
Tehran; two historical opponents of America’s alliance with the Shah. With them came a letter signed
by Carter that they were to personally deliver to Khomeini. It contained the assurance that the Shah
would remain in the U.S. only for the duration of his illness, as well as an offer to procure access to the
shah’s doctors for Iranian representatives. Second, Carter explicitly recognized the independence and
territorial integrity of Iran and expressed his willingness to resume arms exports. Third, he politely
asked Khomeini to have the hostages released. However Khomeini would not entertain diplomacy,
refusing to allow President Carter’s emissaries to enter Iran. Washington responded by expelling Iranian
diplomats as well as all Iranians in the U.S. illegally. This was also accompanied by the cessation of oil
imports from Iran and the freezing of Iranian assets in U.S. banks. These actions failed to make the
slightest impression. As the events unfolded, U.S. diplomats were paraded in front of TV cameras
blindfolded and threatened with execution. For Khomeini it became increasingly evident there would be
no military response from Washington. President Carter entered into protracted negotiations with Iranian
President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr and his minister of foreign affairs, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, via French
mediators. Although both were high-profile Iranian politicos, they were virtually powerless figures in
comparison to Khomeini. America had hoped to influence Iran by using the habitual mix of carrots and
sticks, yet Khomeini was indifferent not only to all material incentives but also to the threat of violence.
By the end of the first week of the drama Khomeini's view of America had changed. Once he had
concluded that America would not take any meaningful action against his regime, Khomeini took over
control of the hostage enterprise and used it to prop up his "anti-imperialist" credentials while

22

outflanking the Iranian left. The surprising show of weakness from Washington also encouraged the
mullahs and the student hostage-takers. Matters worsened when a military mission to rescue the
hostages ended in tragedy in the Iranian desert. In April 1980, Operation Eagle Claw, a top-secret
mission to free the hostages, ended in disaster. From the outset of the mission, a helicopter developed
engine trouble in a staging area of the Iranian desert. Eight Americans were killed as two planes collided
during the subsequent withdrawal of U.S. forces. The force dispatched by Carter fled under the cover of
night, leaving behind the charred bodies of eight of their comrades. 41
When the hostages were finally set free on January 20, 1981, this was thanks neither to
international nor even just allied solidarity, nor, for that matter, to any particular American policy
moves. The idea of providing positive incentives had failed just as much as the threat of armed
intervention. The hostages were liberated in part because Tehran had grown weary of holding them. The
liberation of the hostages was presented as a triumph by Khomeini being that they were only permitted
to leave Iran on the day when Jimmy Carter left the White House. 42 Some also present compelling
evidence that in 1980, while Jimmy Carter was frantically negotiating for an early release of American
hostages in Iran, members of the Ronald Reagan campaign staff had struck a pact with Khomeini. That
deal was allegedly an offer he couldn't refuse—badly needed U.S. arms and spare parts for his war with
Iraq if he kept the U.S. Embassy hostages in Tehran until after Election Day. Of course there were
negotiations with the Carter Administration over the hostages. However the bargaining with Carter was
primarily over money and offered the return of only $4 billion of the $12 billion in Iranian assets seized
in U.S. banks. Carter’s offer involved no arms. There is also another compelling notion. Although
Ayatollah Khomeini had thwarted Jimmy Carter at every turn, Carter's failed rescue attempt might look
mild in comparison to what Ronald Reagan was likely to do in order to gain the release of the American
hostages being held in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. 43
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Although the hostage taking incident remains a thorn in the side of most who would reject the
notion of rapprochement with Iran, it must be noted that this incident was an inevitable outgrowth of
injudicious American foreign policy towards Iran. The invasion itself was perpetrated by elements
radicalized by the U.S. backed, heavy-handed Shah and the revolution. The bulk of the Iranian populace
currently holds America in high regard and laments their plight under the hands of the current theocratic
regime. Although the front of the American embassy in Tehran still remains covered with anti-American
propaganda, that sentiment is not mirrored in the Iranian population. On several occasions during my
visit to the Islamic republic Iranians pointed out the anti-American propaganda on the front of the closed
American embassy with powerful disapproval. While driving past the U.S. embassy, a taxi cab driver
expressed sadness over the embassy’s closure and indicated that he prayed for its reopening, the return
of the Americans, and western influence in Iran. One of my guides, Parviz Rostaminezhad, commented
that historical events, such as the embassy invasion, must not remain the basis of the seemingly
impenetrable roadblock to rapprochement between Washington and Tehran. He noted that the American
presence would be overwhelmingly welcomed by Iranians but unconditional diplomacy rather than
threats and sanctions were the key to moderating Tehran. 44

President Reagan’s Term
Ronald Reagan began his term at the White House when U.S.-Iranian relations had entered a
deep freeze that still lingers to this day. 1980 was a period when Iran and Iraq began warring with one
another. Washington evidently did not want Iran to emerge victoriously. Khomeini was perceived by
policymakers as a serious threat to the stability of the region and to vital interests, namely oil supplies
and the security of Israel. However, Saddam Hussein was also recognized as a psychopath who was
backed by the Soviet Union. Hussein was less of a threat to American interests but certainly no ally.
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Initially, Washington decided to support the pro-Western regimes in the region by bulwarking their
defenses. It was surmised and hoped that the combatants would weaken each other to the point that
neither would emerge from the war as an aggressive regional hegemon.
However as time passed it became evident the Reagan Administration was leaning in favor of
Iraq. Washington had plenty of motives to favor Saddam over the Iranians. The United States was still
reeling from the 1980 U.S. embassy takeover and truck bombings to its marine barracks in Beirut earlier
in 1983. Despite the objections from Congress, Reagan had the State Department remove Baghdad from
its list of state sponsors of terrorism, an act that opened avenues for economic aid and trade. Soon
thereafter Reagan ordered a review of U.S. policy in the Middle East which resulted in a marked shift in
favor of Iraq. Economic aid began pouring into Iraq in the form of hundreds of millions of dollars worth
of loan guarantees to buy U.S. agricultural products; indirectly aiding the war effort. 45 Washington also
began passing high-value military intelligence to Iraq to help it fight the war, including information from
U.S. satellites that helped fix key flaws in the fortifications protecting al-Basrah that proved important in
Iran's defeat during the course of the war. 46
Reagan's special Middle East envoy, Donald Rumsfeld, was credited with establishing the back
door avenue of communication to Saddam on a clandestine visit to Baghdad in December 1983. During
the course of this visit and another in early 1984, Rumsfeld reassured the Iraqi leadership that it had
broad latitude in prosecuting the war against Iran, to include using poison gas. 47 A November 1983
National Security Directive evidently set the stage for this stance indicating that U.S. policy was to do
"whatever was necessary and legal" to stop Iran from winning. 48
In 1984 the CIA began providing Iraq intelligence that was utilized to calibrate its mustard gas
attacks on Iranian troops. 49 Subsequently the CIA established a direct Washington-Baghdad intelligence
link and provided Iraq with data from sensitive U.S. satellite reconnaissance photography to assist Iraqi
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bombing raids. It is evident this data was essential to Iraq’s effectiveness against the Iranians. During the
course of the war Iraq continued to use chemical weapons against Iranian forces. Washington never
commented publicly despite noting almost daily in internal reports the Iraqi use of chemical weapons.
Although the use of chemical weapons in war is in violation of the Geneva accords of 1925, during the
last major battle of the Iran-Iraq war, 65,000 Iranians were killed – many with poison gas. 50
The Iran-Iraq war endured for nearly eight years – from September of 1980 until August of 1988.
The hostilities ceased when Iran accepted United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 598, which
led to a cease-fire in August 1988. Although the UN-arranged cease-fire ended to the fighting, the two
isolated states pursued an arms race with each other as well as other countries in the region. 51
Shortly before the end of the Iran-Iraq War, July 3, 1988, the USS Vincennes was patrolling the
northern portion of the Straits of Hormuz. A group of Iranian gunboats had been threatening a Pakistani
merchant vessel and one fired on the Vincennes. During the confrontation with the gunboats, the
Vincennes picked up an aircraft on radar moving in its direction. After the plane failed to respond to the
ship's warnings the Vincennes fired two surface-to-air missiles bringing the plane down. The aircraft
turned out to be an Iran Air commercial jet carrying 290 people. 52 There were no survivors and Tehran
claimed it was an intentional act. President Reagan characterized the event as a terrible accident,
apologized and offered to pay compensation to the victims. In February 1996, the United States agreed
to pay Iran $61.8 million in compensation for the Iranians killed in the shoot down. 53
Another event characterizing hot and cold relations between the leaders of Iran and the U.S. is
the worst political moment of Reagan’s eight years in the White House – the Iran-Contra scandal. The
affair involved an arms-for-hostages scheme that could have resulted in his removal from office. Reagan
had been cautioned by both his secretary of defense and state regarding the illicit nature of the
clandestine operation but followed through despite their warnings. “Iran-Contra,” unfolded in the mid-
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1980s and became the sobriquet for a complicated back-channel operation during which U.S.
government officials violated an arms embargo by secretly selling weapons to Iran. The arms were
initially funneled through Israel and in return Iran was to help free American hostages held in Lebanon.
Subsequently officials used the profits from the arms sales to illegally assist the Nicaraguan “Contra”
rebels in toppling that country's duly elected Marxist government. However it was well known at the
time that Congress, through the Boland Amendment, had prohibited U.S. aid to the Contras. 54
In November 1986 the Lebanese newspaper al-Shiraa reported that the United States secretly
sold arms to Iran. The Iranian Speaker of the Parliament, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, confirmed the
secret deal in a speech to the Iranian Parliament the following day. This revelation caused Chief of Staff
Donald Regan to urge President Reagan to "go public" about the arrangement. However John Poindexter
discouraged Reagan from doing so. As a result, Reagan went on to assure reporters that the allegations
had emanated from the Middle East and had no foundation. However, days later the President changed
his story in a televised address to the nation, when he admitted to shipping some missiles to Iran but
denied that the arms were sold to win the release of American hostages. As the crisis continued to build,
Reagan went before the press and perpetuated the falsehood that the United States had nothing to do
with other countries or their shipments of arms to Iran, including Israel. Unfortunately, Poindexter had
already briefed the press about the U.S. negotiations with Israel to provide the weapons making the
falsity of Reagan's account utterly transparent to everyone. 55
President Reagan requested an independent review of all the events by a three-person
commission headed by former Texas senator John Tower. A special prosecutor, Lawrence Walsh, was
also assigned to look into possible illegal activities in the executive branch. Reagan maintained total
ignorance of the actions of those who directly supervised the channeling of funds to Central America,

27

namely Colonel North and former National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane. However Reagan also
resisted the implication that he was a passive and oblivious bystander in his own administration.
In February 1987, the Tower Commission issued its report and concluded that there had been
widespread abuse of power among renegade members of Reagan’s staff who allegedly, without the
President’s knowledge, engineered and engaged in an illicit conspiracy. The report faulted Secretary of
State George Shultz, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, and President Reagan himself for their
evident inability to effectively oversee the actions of their subordinates. The report stopped short of
accusing the President of engaging in or approving any illegal conduct. Special Prosecutor Lawrence
Walsh later made similar findings and was unable to establish complicity on the part of the President. 56

Shah Ali Hosayni Khamenei
President Ali Hashemi Rafsanjani
President George H.W. Bush’s Term
When Shah Khomeini died in June 1989, the Assembly of Experts, an elected body of senior
clerics, chose the outgoing President of the republic to be his successor. Ali Khamenei, assumed power
of the republic in what proved to be a smooth transition. Khamenei also transformed the position of
supreme leader by bringing many of the powers of the presidency with him into that office, turning it
into an omnipotent overseer of Iran's political scene. 57
In August 1989, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the speaker of the National Assembly, was
elected President by an overwhelming majority. Iran’s relations with the West began to improve under
Rafsanjani’s guidance. This was due in part to Rafsanjani’s role in obtaining the release of Western
hostages held by pro-Iranian Shi’ite groups in Lebanon, the last of whom was released in 1992.
Rafsanjani, who has long been viewed as a Machiavellian figure in Iranian politics, maintained close ties
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with Khomeini during the years following the 1979 Islamic revolution and consolidated strong support
amongst Iran's elite Revolutionary Guards. Rafsanjani proved to be more pragmatic on issues involving
Iran's dealings with the West and was very much disturbed by Iran's growing isolation. 58
In August 1990, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait over allegations that Kuwait was slant drilling
into Iraq territory. The mechanized infantry, armor, and tank units of the Iraqi Republican Guard
invaded Kuwait and seized control of that country. The invasion triggered Operation Desert Shield, a
U.S. led effort to deter any invasion of Kuwait's oil rich neighbor, Saudi Arabia.59 Although Khamenei
condemned the invasion he bitterly criticized Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing Arab countries that
invited American troops into their countries after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Khamenei characterized
the event as a holy war asserting that anyone who engaged America's aggression, greediness and its
plans to encroach on the Persian Gulf region had engaged in a holy war in the cause of Allah.
Furthermore, he indicated that anyone killed on that path was a martyr.
Gary Sick, an American expert on Iranian affairs, suggested that Khamenei’s remarks were
motivated by Iran's desire to keep oil prices high, preserve its “revolutionary” credentials and keep
President Hussein in a protracted confrontation with the United States. 60 Despite Khamenei’s strident
rhetoric, Iran remained neutral during the U.S. led intervention in Kuwait and subsequent march into
Iraq. It is also important to note that Tehran pursued an almost contradictory foreign policy in this case.
It strongly condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait while energetically pursuing a peace settlement with
Baghdad. Tehran’s seemingly ambivalent stance towards Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait demonstrated the
pragmatic leadership of President Rafsanjani's Government. Although Washington had engaged Iran’s
brutal, long-time foe (Saddam Hussein), Tehran was also not prepared to reject the notion that the
United States is a force seeking to dominate the gulf region's oil resources to the detriment of both Iran
and Iraq. 61
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In January 1991 Bush asked Congress for “all necessary means” to expel Iraq from Kuwait. He
received congressional approval to use force, and in mid-January 1991 the U.S.-led allies launched a
punishing aerial assault on strategic sites in Iraq. In a ground war in late February, allied forces drove
the Iraqis from Kuwait and subsequently well into Iraq. Bush’s popularity rose to historic highs for a
President, but he drew criticism for ordering a cease-fire before Iraq’s president, Saddam Hussein, was
ousted. President George H.W. Bush later defended his administration's decision to forgo invading Iraq
and toppling Saddam from power after Iraqi forces were forced to withdraw from Kuwait. Bush felt that
occupying Iraq would have unilaterally exceeded the United Nations’ mandate and would have
destroyed the precedent of international response to aggression his administration hoped to establish. In
his opinion the invasion route would have left the U.S. as an occupying power in a bitterly hostile land
where the coalition forces would have collapsed; the Arabs deserting it in anger and other allies pulling
out as well. Furthermore, under those circumstances, Bush saw no viable "exit strategy" which violated
another one of his administration’s principles. 62
Although Iran criticized Washington during and in the wake of the Gulf War, accusing it of
regional interference, Khamenei and Rafsanjani showcased their Persian pragmatism. Despite strident
rhetoric, Iran remained neutral as the U.S. engaged and hobbled the military apparatus of its arch
nemesis – Saddam Hussein. The Hussein regime represented the region’s principle strategic
counterweight to Iran and evidently Tehran recognized that although U.S. forces had occupied
neighboring territories – the first Bush Administration was, in essence, performing an enormous favor
for Iran.
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President Clinton’s Term
Surprisingly, the demonization of Tehran reached new heights during the course of the Clinton
Administration. According to the Clinton Administration, Iran represented a threat to the international
community as a whole in several areas. First, it had speculatively engaged in sponsoring international
terrorism in order to destabilize particular American allies. Second, it opposed the notion of an ArabIsraeli peace process and allegedly sought to derail it. Third, it actively endeavored to acquire nuclear
weapons. Fourth, Tehran was presumably rebuilding its military machine with offensive equipment and
technology, which posed a threat to the Persian Gulf region. Finally, Tehran's record of human rights
was spotlighted and evaluated as dismal at best. The Clinton Administration’s assertions were
unequivocal in that Washington perceived Tehran as a hostile international actor. Iranian leadership
reaction to Clinton’s accusations was best summed up by President Rafsanjani's reply to an American
correspondent who asked whether Tehran could prove its innocence. President Rafsanjani emphasized
that in a court one is innocent until proven guilty and that it was the responsibility of the accuser to
prove the guilt, not the accused. 63
In 1993, the Clinton Administration turned down a request by Boeing to sell Iran civil aircraft
needed for expanding Iran Air's level of operations. A majority of Iran Air's fleet consisted of Boeings
and the year prior Iran Air had negotiated the purchase of 16 Boeing 737-400's. As a result of the sale
ban, Boeing lost a $900 million contract and Iran Air purchased aircraft from the European aerospace
consortium Air Bus. Similarly, in 1993 BP America had negotiated the sale of a chemical fertilizer plant
with Iran. The sale was again prohibited by the Clinton Administration on the grounds that the
technology may be of a dual purpose nature, resulting in a $100 million sales loss to BP America.
The most publicized loss regarding sanctions on Iran has been Conoco, a subsidiary of DuPont
Corporation. On 15 March 1995, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12957, banning U.S.
contributions to the development of petroleum resources in Iran. It came 10 days after Conoco had
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signed a $1 billion contract for developing two off-shore Iranian oil and gas fields. Pressure from the
U.S. Congress continued and two months later President Clinton issued Executive Order 12959. The
second order expanded the previous sanctions to include a total trade and investment embargo on Iran.
Iran was declared an extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the
U.S. This executive order has some extraterritorial reach since U.S. companies would not be allowed to
facilitate any activities involving trade with Iran and severe restrictions were imposed on the re-export
of U.S. or partially-U.S. products. Iran’s alleged support for international terrorism and development of
weapons of mass destruction were among the justifications for President Clinton’s executive orders. 64
As a result of the Executive Orders and investment sanctions, Conoco was forced to withdraw from the
contract to develop the Iranian oil and gas fields. This paved way for France's Total, which ultimately
assumed control of the project. 65
In late 1994, the Republicans gained control of both Houses of Congress and were looking at
sanctions against unpopular foreign governments as a way to placate powerful pressure groups such as
the America Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). Additionally, the Republican dominated
Congress also sought to erode the power of the Democratic Clinton Administration. AIPAC had exerted
considerable pressure on the Administration and Congress to act against Iran for a number of reasons.
Iran had allegedly supported terrorist activities against Israel, which had experienced a series of
bombing attacks perpetrated by Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Israeli intelligence had also
informed Washington that Iran was acquiring components for nuclear weapons. Israel highlighted
Russian plans to assist Iran in the completion of a civilian nuclear power reactor in Bushehr; a reactor
Washington had pressured Germany not to build. AIPAC pushed for comprehensive U.S. sanctions
against Iran, including secondary U.S. sanctions against foreign companies seeking to invest in Iran’s
petroleum sector.
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What followed was a race between conservative Republicans and the Clinton Administration on
Iran. President Clinton was under intense pressure to introduce legislation on U.S. sanctions against Iran
to avoid passage of even more restrictive legislation introduced by Senator D’Amato of New York who
was supported on this issue by the majority in the U.S. Senate. Despite the Administration’s earlier
executive orders (March and May 1995), the Senate passed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) of
1996 (Libya had been added by Senator Kennedy because of the Lockerbie bombing). The bill passed
with almost no opposition in the Senate and House, which shows how little power the international oil
companies have on matters pertaining to Middle East policy. 66
ILSA was passed when Iranian President Rafsanjani was still in office. Moderate Iranian
President Mohammad Khatami was elected during a period when Washington’s efforts to contain Iran
were at their highest. However, ILSA had met with stiff resistance throughout the world, nowhere more
so than in Europe due to its extraterritorial nature. ILSA also made things difficult with pro-western
Arab states in the Gulf who engaged in substantial commerce with Iran. Iran’s economy is dependent on
foreign investment and Tehran conceded that ILSA was effective in deterring such investment. In an
August, 1998 report to the UN, Iran stated that ILSA had “led to the disruption of the country's
economic system, . . . caused a decline in its gross national product, . . . [and] weakened the country's
ability to deal with its international lenders, . . . which impeded credit transactions.” Iran went on to
report that ILSA created difficulties in the petroleum and oil sector, such as “reduction in international
investment, delays in oil projects, cancellation of some tender contracts, technological shortcomings,
and increased negotiating expenses.” President Khatami acknowledged later in 1998 that U.S. sanctions
had ''inflicted damage” upon Iran. 67
The animosity between the U.S. and Iran, rather apparent during Clinton's first term, lessened to
a certain degree during the period following his reelection. The precipitating factor was the unexpected
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and overwhelming election of Mohammed Khatami as Iran’s president in May 1997. Surprisingly,
Khatami captured approximately 70% of the popular vote. Khatami was a moderate Iranian leader who
sought to increase cultural and personal freedom in Iran. He also sought to improve relations with Iran’s
Gulf neighbors, Europe, and, to a lesser degree, the United States. However, Khatami would remain
challenged by hardliners in the Iranian regime to include Iran's religious leader Ayatollah Khamenei, a
supreme leader with complete control over important institutions such as Iran’s military and police. 68
Iranian foreign relations with Washington during the Clinton Administration generally assumed
a posture of accommodation. However, it was evident that the Clinton Administration succumbed to
domestic pressures from partisans and special interest groups and ultimately did not perceive Tehran as
a regime with which Washington could diplomatically interact. In every instance that President
Rafsanjani and Khatami signaled that economic interaction would be the basis of rapprochement those
advances were casually rebuffed.

President George W. Bush’s Term
Iranian President Mohammad Khatami took office in 1997, before George W. Bush was elected
U.S. President in 2001. Khatami was subsequently re-elected in 2001 by an overwhelming majority. He
was perceived by many as more amenable to relations with the United States as well as opening up his
country to democratic reforms. Khatami was viewed as a possible reformist countermeasure to Iran’s
supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, and his coterie of clerics. Many felt the Clinton and Bush
Administrations would ultimately diplomatically engage Khatami – a long awaited alternative to Iran’s
fundamentalist hardliners. However, President Clinton had sealed avenues for economic engagement in
furtherance of Iranian containment. President Bush soon concluded with his senior foreign policy
advisers that Khatami and his supporters in the government were "too weak, ineffective and not serious
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about delivering on their promises" to transform Iranian society. Bush revealed his stance publicly in a
strongly worded presidential statement during which he praised large pro-democracy street
demonstrations in Iran. The shift emboldened foreign policy experts who had urged a tougher approach
toward Tehran – a setback for the State Department, which had spearheaded efforts to engage the
Khatami leadership. 69
The oil industry was extremely optimistic that the Bush Administration would allow the
unilateral ILSA to expire and die quietly. Both President Bush and Vice President Cheney were oilmen
who realized that unilateral sanctions were ineffective and were only preventing U.S. oil companies
from competing with Europe. Many future senior members of the Bush Administration were somewhat
outspoken in their opposition to unilateral sanctions and the oil industry assumed the Bush
Administration would not renew ILSA when it expired in August 2001. However, the Cheney energy
report in the spring of 2001 surprised many in that it favored the use of sanctions as a tool to advance
national and global security objectives. The new Administration’s policy towards sanctions was no
doubt influenced largely by AIPAC, which was actively pushing for a renewal of ILSA. In June 2001,
74 Senators sponsored a five-year ILSA extension and in August 2001 President Bush signed the ILSA
Extension Act into law. 70 Public statements made by the Iranian President Khatami and his counterparts
revealed that Iran's policy towards the U.S. would not change unless the U.S. took the first step. “As
long as American politicians act under the influence of certain lobbies, harming even the interests of
American companies and hinder the Iranian economy by sanctions and embargoes, there will be no
change,” Khatami stated during a press conference in June 2001. He added that “these sanctions are
obstacles, and we do not accept any preconditions. If anyone is to impose any conditions, it should be
us, who have been the victims of the oppressive policies of the United States.” 71
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The 9/11 attacks rearranged Washington’s approach to the Middle East, bringing Iran into focus
geopolitically as a possible strategic ally that must be engaged in furtherance of the American led “war
on terror.” Tehran harbored a powerful disdain for the likes of al-Qaeda and the Taliban and possessed
influence in Afghanistan that was useful to Washington. The period leading up to the U.S. invasion of
Afghanistan was a time of extraordinary strategic cooperation between Tehran and Washington. While
Washington established the logistical aspects of the military engagement in Afghanistan, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs – Ryan Crocker – organized several discreet
meetings with Iranian officials in Geneva. During the course of those meetings, Iran offered search-andrescue help, humanitarian assistance, and even advice on which targets to bomb in Afghanistan. The
Iranians, who had extensive experience in Afghanistan, namely working with the main anti-Taliban
coalition – the Northern Alliance – also informed Washington about how to negotiate the major ethnic
and political fault lines in the country. During a conference to establish a post-Taliban Afghan
government, Iran pressed its allies in the Northern Alliance to limit their demands for ministerial seats
and ensured anti-terrorism language was engineered into the agreement. 72 During the course of that
international conference, the Iranians helped establish the post-Taliban Karzai government. “They were,
in many ways, our principal collaborators at that meeting,” said James Dobbins, President Bush's envoy
to the gathering. Dobbins indicated that the Iranian envoy, Javad Zarif, persuaded the Northern Alliance
to share power with other factions, a crucial step in establishing Karzai's government. 73 However, after
Tehran’s cooperation during the course of the invasion of Afghanistan and Afghan President Hamid
Karzai’s subsequent election, Washington immediately discouraged Karzai from seeking intimate ties
with Iran. Alhtough Iran was publicly praised by the United States for their positive role in Afghanistan,
shortly thereafter Tehran was identified by the Bush Administration as one of the three protagonists in
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the infamous “axis of evil”.74 That label had bewildered and humiliated Iranians who were most vocal in
regard to normalized relations with the United States.
Khatami battled Iran's clerical hard-liners for eight years and transformed the nation's political
landscape; however he failed to effect a much needed structural change. Khatami was constitutionally
required to leave office after two consecutive terms. Senior statesman and former two-term President Ali
Rafsanjani campaigned on a socially moderate and reform-minded platform, but evidently Iranian voters
were more attracted to the revolutionary candidate. In June of 2005, the hard-line mayor of Tehran,
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who had invoked Iran's 1979 revolution and expressed doubts about
rapprochement with the United States, was elected president of the Islamic republic in a landslide with
62% of the popular vote. 75
Ironically, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and George W. Bush have more similarities
than either would care to admit. Namely in the realm of their fiery speeches and confrontational stances
that have served more to annoy the international community rather than appealing to it in a diplomatic
sense. Ahmedinejad came into the Presidency at a time U.S. containment measures and debate over
Iran’s nuclear intentions were in full swing. While reiterating his country’s commitment to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, Ahmedinejad inferred Washington was utilizing the U.N. Security Council as a
tool of “threat and coercion”. Washington played a large role in helping craft a U.N. Security Council
resolution passed in July 2006 that gave Iran until late August to suspend its uranium enrichment, asking
the IAEA to report on Tehran's compliance, dangling the threat of sanctions if Iran refused. Tehran
beamed unequivocally long before the deadline expired that it had no intention of suspending its
uranium enrichment, which it asserts is for peaceful purposes. “All our nuclear activities are transparent,
peaceful and under the watchful eyes of inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency”,
Ahmadinejad said. Ahmedinejad went on to accuse the U.S. of dragging its feet in Iraq in order to
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preserve its occupation, “It seems that intensification of hostilities and terrorism serves as a pretext for
the continued presence of foreign forces in Iraq.” 76
The Bush Administration has thus far resisted any suggestion of negotiations with Iran. But it is
coming under increasing pressure from its European allies and from the leading senators on the Foreign
Relations Committee to alter that dangerous attitude. The battle between American neoconservatives
and Iranian hardliners persist despite many conciliatory gestures on the part of the Iranians. President
Bush’s policy has not discouraged Iran’s nuclear endeavors. Rather, it has merely emboldened Iranian
hardliners who argue that the Bush Administration has no interest in rapprochement with Iran and that it
is in Tehran’s best interests to reach bomb capacity as soon as possible. 77
Ahmadinejad too has faced harsh domestic criticism. The Iranian President’s popularity has also
plummeted on the basis of his failure to fulfill election promises with respect to the economy and
individual freedom. A poll run by the Tehran-based news website “Baztab” two years after
Ahmadinejad came to power found that his popularity had sunk substantially. A poll of 20,000 people
revealed that 62.5% of respondents who had voted for Ahmadinejad in 2005 would not seek to reelect
him. The Ahmadinejad Administration's aggressive and unyielding foreign policy is perceived by many
Iranians as the cause of the increasing isolation of Iran and the sanctions imposed upon the country for
refusing to halt its controversial nuclear program. 78
During the course of my travels within the Islamic Republic, I met several individuals who spoke
favorably of President George W. Bush, but none who spoke positively of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Much like the American citizenry, most Iranians were historically myopic and were powerfully
consumed by the political now. Commentary with regard to Ahmadinejad always began with a
pronounced facial scowl and Iranian women were quick to attribute a renewed social rigidity to
Ahmadinejad’s presidency. Fear of Ahmadinejad’s far reaching rigidity was underscored for this
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researcher during the course of an interview conducted outside the Sadabad Palace in the Shemiran area
of Tehran. Bita Molkava, a college educated English interpreter, spoke confidently on the matter of
Iranian politics but noticeably lowered her voice to the level of a whisper when saying the name
“Ahmadinejad”. Bita indicated his election did not occasion a positive environment for women and
brought about a renewed enforcement of female dress codes. 79 Ironically, President George W. Bush
enjoyed popularity among the Iranian populace for his incessant castigation of the Iranian government,
the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, and the facilitation of his subsequent execution. On my
return flight to the United States from Tehran I took the opportunity to interview the Iranian woman
seated next to me, Mahnaz Mazaheri Assadi. Mahnaz was a strongly opinionated woman who held a
PhD level education in the field of Bioscience and Biotechnology. She regarded the Ahmadinejad
presidency with strong disapproval and felt his ascension to power was the product of Washington’s
policy and harsh rhetoric towards Iran. Mahnaz surmised that renewed dialogue and diplomacy between
Washington and Tehran would result not only in a vibrant Iranian economy but also a moderation of
Iran’s rigid social codes. 80
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CHAPTER 3: STATE LEVEL EXAMINATION

Terrorism
Contrary to the rhetoric of rabid western ideologues, Muslims and Islamic entities across the
globe were outspokenly vocal in their condemnation of the events on 9/11, characterizing them senseless
attacks on innocent human beings. Many in the Islamic world were as shocked and disturbed by the
terrifying images of the event as those in the west. Iranian President Mohammad Khatami was among
the first world leaders to condemn the 9/11 attacks and express his sympathy stating, “On behalf of the
Iranian government and the nation, I condemn the hijacking attempts and terrorist attacks on public
centers in American cities which have killed a large number of innocent people.” “My deep sympathy
goes out to the American nation, particularly those who have suffered from the attacks and also the
families of the victims,” the Iranian President said in a statement, adding that “terrorism is doomed and
the international community should stem it and take effective measures in a bid to eradicate it”. Khatami
asserted that the Islamic Republic is treading a road to uproot terrorism and to this end, he noted, it will
spare no efforts. 81 Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, also strongly condemned the suicide
terrorist attacks but discouraged notions of an emotional counter-offensive in Afghanistan. “Mass
killings of human beings are catastrophic acts which are condemned…..wherever they may happen and
whoever the perpetrators and the victims may be,” Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said in a
televised September 2001 discussion. 82 Furthermore, the conservative Iranian media and authorities
followed suit in condemning the terrorist attacks. Hardliner magazine Siyasat-e-Ruz openly posited,
“any act that victimizes innocent people, whatever their race or nationality, for achieving the goal of
greedy international politics, is severely condemned and is a terrorist and anti-human act.” Iranian
citizens also mourned America’s losses and responded with a genuine and spontaneous outpouring of
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sympathy. Sixty thousand spectators observed a minute of silence during a soccer match in Iran’s Azadi
stadium. Hundreds of young Iranians held a candlelit vigil in Tehran for the victims who perished in the
9/11 attacks. The routine chants of “death to America” that had become a staple part of Friday prayers in
Iran ceased in deference to American suffering. The degree of unanimity exhibited over a foreign policy
issue was unprecedented in the history of the revolutionary Islamic Republic. 83

From an ideological standpoint the worldviews of al-Qaeda and Iran are completely at odds. Iran
is a stable sovereign entity and al-Qaeda is a radical non-state terrorist actor. Iran seeks to shore up its
national security interests while al-Qaeda endeavors to eliminate national boundaries and re-establish the
caliphate, the seventh-century Islamic empire. The figureheads of al-Qaeda leaders completely reject the
notion of solidarity between Shi’a and Sunni Muslims and exclude the Shi’a from their midst; namely
the sect that predominates in Iran – Twelver Shi’a.84 The Iranian response to 9/11 led to expectations
that Washington would seize the opportunity for limited rapprochement and factor Iran into an antiTaliban coalition – a notion that was overwhelmingly prudent in a geopolitical sense. The Iranian
overtures were more than subtle in that Tehran was willing to put aside its grievances and join the west
in eradicating unsavory elements – especially the Taliban. Iran had regularly supplied the Northern
Alliance, a collection of mainly Tajik and Uzbek anti-Taliban militias, with arms and intelligence.
Iranian intelligence officers regularly meet with Northern Alliance commanders. Diplomats in Tehran
say that information gleaned from those meetings is regularly relayed to India and Russia, which also
supported the Northern Alliance. A majority Shi’a Muslim country, Iran had opposed the Sunni
extremist Taliban since 1996 when it assumed power over Afghanistan. Iran denounced the Taliban’s
extremist version of Islam asserting that it has cast a negative light upon the faith. In a domestic sense,
Iranian officials had legitimate reasons to be concerned regarding the Taliban’s anti-Shi’a views and the
presence of a hostile regime with the backing of two regional powers – Pakistan and Saudi Arabia – on
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their border. Additionally, Iran and the Taliban had been at odds since Taliban forces, during the course
of a military offensive against the Northern Alliance, killed 11 Iranian diplomats in Mazar-i-Sharif in
1998.

Iranian parliamentarian Mohammad Kazem Jalili seemed to confirm Tehran’s desire to
cooperate with the U.S. when shortly after the 9/11 attacks he told The Washington Post that “Iran is
interested in joining the anti-terrorism coalition,” and that such a development would positively impact
future relations between Tehran and Washington. A mid September report in Canada's National Post
also contributed to the notion of rapprochement. It was reported that, via a Canadian intermediary,
Tehran sent a message to Washington that there would be no Iranian opposition to military strikes
against the parties responsible for the September 11 attacks. 85 Although the White House and the State
Department had expressed interest in a gradual rapprochement with Iran, the U.S. Congress failed to
demonstrate a willingness to expend political capital on the Iran issue. No doubt, Tehran was willing to
cooperate but such engagement would have necessitated incentives on Washington’s part. Meaningful
incentives for Iranian cooperation would have entailed carrots such as a lifting of U.S. sanctions on Iran,
the withdrawal of U.S. opposition to Caspian Sea pipelines traversing Iran and an end to U.S. attempts
to isolate Iran internationally. 86

Evidently Washington needed Iran’s influence in Afghanistan – namely in getting the Northern
Alliance to support the Karzai post-Taliban Afghan government engineered by Washington. Iran
rendered vital assistance and as a result they did ultimately seize an opportunity to settle an old score
with the Taliban who had long been in their crosshairs. Iranian assistance surely came as a pleasant
surprise to Washington’s right wing ideologues. During this period of warming relations between
Washington and Tehran, President George W. Bush delivered his first State of the Union address in
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January 2002. During the speech Iran was mentioned as a member state within an “axis of evil” that
aggressively pursued weapons of mass destruction and exported terror. Bush went on to claim that Iran,
in union with terrorist allies, was arming to threaten the peace of the world. The speech immediately
dashed all hopes of rapprochement and alienated Iranian moderates who had pressed for reconciliation
with Washington. In light of Tehran’s vital support during the course of the U.S. led invasion of
Afghanistan, many in the international community were shocked to hear the American’s characterizing
the Iranian’s as evil. Moderate Iranian President Khatami immediately criticized President Bush’s
characterization of Iran accusing a U.S.-Israeli alliance of “exploiting the ominous phenomenon of
terrorism as an excuse for creating war and domination.” The convergence of interests in Afghanistan
was evidently ephemeral revealing that hostility between Tehran and Washington will not be easily
overcome. Khatami highlighted President George W. Bush's inexperience in world affairs and the clout
of pro-Israel factions in Washington as the basis for the fomenting of an escalation of violence
threatening to ignite the Middle East. The reformist movement in Iran sustained a sharp setback as a
result of President Bush's rhetoric. The "axis of evil" comment clearly eliminated the opportunity for
convergence between Tehran and Washington over a shared antipathy toward Afghanistan’s Taliban
regime. Iranian moderates had begun to compete for influence in foreign policy, an arena dominated by
Iran's supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. However, President Bush’s speech immediately dashed all notions
of moderates gaining traction in that respect. Khatami indicated that threats from Washington,
specifically President Bush, resulted in the hardening of “national solidarity” in Iran, rhetoric that
inferred the “axis of evil” comment had dramatically reduced his domestic political clout. 87

Without any support by intelligence analysts, the Bush Administration has persistently alleged
that Iran has harbored al-Qaeda operatives who had fled from Afghanistan and that they had participated
in planning terrorist actions. Pentagon officials were also leaking information to the media and their
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audiences in order to infer that they had evidence that Al Qaeda had been provided “safe haven” in Iran
and was planning and directing terrorist activities abroad. However, a majority of U.S. intelligence
analysts specializing on the Persian Gulf perceived that the Al-Qaeda operatives situated in Iran, who
were in communication with operatives elsewhere, were in hiding rather than being harbored by the
Iranians. A former national intelligence officer for Near East and South Asia – Paul Pillar – revealed
when being interviewed by Inter Press Service in a 2006 interview that the “general impression” was
that al-Qaeda operatives were not in Iran with the complicity of the Iranian authorities.88 Kenneth
Pollack, a former CIA analyst who was a Persian Gulf specialist on the National Security Council staff
in 2001 stated in his book, The Persian Puzzle, “These al-Qaeda leaders apparently were operating in
eastern Iran, which is a bit like the Wild West.” However, he also pointed out, “It was not as if these alQaeda leaders had been under lock and key in Evin prison in Tehran and were allowed to make phone
calls to set up the attacks.” 89 During the course of my field research in Iran I discussed the notion of
Usama bin Laden or al-Qaeda operatives operating within Iran with the complicity of Iranians with an
English teacher in Isfahan, Mehrdad Doulatshahi. Mehrdad suggested that those who would consider
such an idea to be true were truly ignorant with regard to the Islamic world and Middle Eastern politics.
Mehrdad further added that Iranians viewed Islamic extremism with a profound hatred and would tear
bin Laden or any of his operatives to pieces with their bare hands if they encountered them within Iran. 90

Intelligence reports have confirmed that Tehran is no friend to al-Qaeda and remains committed
to preventing its operatives from utilizing its territory as a safe house or regional pathway. In early 2007,
the CIA sent an urgent report to President Bush's National Security Council indicating that Iranian
authorities had arrested two al-Qaeda operatives traveling through Iran on their way from Pakistan to
Iraq. The operatives were captured while traversing a well-worn, if little-noticed, passage utilized by
militants determined to engage U.S. troops in Iraq. Intelligence officials presented the detentions to
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Bush's senior policy advisers as evidence that Iran was evidently committed to preventing al-Qaeda
operatives from utilizing its soil as a thoroughfare to zones of conflict. This intelligence assessment
came at a time when the Bush Administration, in an effort to push for further U.N. sanctions on the
Islamic Republic, was preparing to publicly accuse Tehran of cooperating with and harboring al-Qaeda
operatives. However, the accusation would have been groundless in light of Iran’s early cooperation in
the U.S. led war on terror. According to senior U.S. intelligence and administration officials, when alQaeda militants fled by droves into Iran from Afghanistan in the winter of 2001, Tehran handed over
hundreds of them to U.S. allies and provided U.S. intelligence with the names, photographs and
fingerprints of those it held in custody. In early 2003, Iran offered to turn over high-value al-Qaeda
targets directly to the United States in exchange for a group of exiled Iranian militants hiding in Iraq.
Among the high level detainees was Usama Bin Laden’s son, therefore President Bush’s top advisors
pushed for the exchange being that the trade would most likely have produced a wealth of valuable
intelligence on al-Qaeda. Although the trade would have released individuals on the State Department’s
terrorist list, they were individuals who had aligned with Saddam Hussein in effort to overthrow the
Iranian government and were not in danger of wandering free after the exchange. Vice President Cheney
and former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld convinced President Bush to rebuff the exchange offer.
The trade was rejected on the basis that any cooperation would legitimize Iran and other “sponsors of
terrorism”. Ultimately, the National Security Council indicated it would accept intelligence on al-Qaeda
from Iran but would give nothing in exchange for such cooperation. 91

Both Tehran and Washington’s interests are clearly consonant in regard to radical organizations
such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban, which makes the aversion to rapprochement all the more politically
irrational. Additionally, radical elements benefit from Iran and the United States being at odds over an
issue where they are natural allies.
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Capitalizing upon the lingering animus, Bin Laden is alleged to be engineering plans such as
exploiting or even triggering an all-out war between the United States and Iran. Evidence suggests that
Al Qaeda in Iraq and elements of the Iraqi Sunni community increasingly consider Iranian influence in
Iraq to be a far greater threat than the American military occupation. In a Shi’ite-dominated Iraq, alQaeda fears the Sunni minority would become politically benign after the American exodus.

It is important to note that a war between America and Iran would benefit the jihad against both
groups. By pitting two of the Sunni jihadis worst enemies against each other, the radicals would be
essentially killing two birds with one stone. A full-scale U.S. invasion and occupation of Iran would be a
jackpot for al-Qaeda. The endeavor would presumably depose the Shi’ite regime in Tehran, further
antagonize Muslims worldwide, and expand al-Qaeda's battlefield against the United States so that it
extends from Anbar Province in the west to the Khyber Pass in the east. It is well known, especially
amongst al-Qaeda operatives, that the U.S. military is currently overly committed in its occupation of
Afghanistan and Iraq. If the U.S. is to invade Iran, it is expected that Washington will resort to the use of
nuclear weapons. According to Bruce Riedel, a former Special Assistant to the President and Senior
Director for Near East Affairs on the National Security Council (1997-2002), the biggest danger is that
al-Qaeda will deliberately provoke a war with a "false-flag" operation (a terrorist attack carried out in a
way that would make it appear as though it were Iran’s doing). Reidel has posited that Washington
should remain extremely wary of such machinations on the part of radical organizations such as alQaeda. 92 A document recovered in an al-Qaeda hideout in Iraq indicated the terrorist organization
considered drawing the United States into a war with Iran in order to undermine the effectiveness U.S.
and Iraqi forces have had putting the organization to rout. The document’s author bemoaned the fact that
al-Qaeda had been greatly weakened and posited that opening another front in the war would divert U.S.
efforts in Iraq. According to the memo part of the diversion is “to entangle the American forces into
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another war against another country,” or to create friction between the United States and its Shi’ite allies
in Iraq. The document suggests “first to exaggerate the Iranian danger and to convince America and the
West in general, of the real danger coming from Iran.” Furthermore insurgents proposed fabricating
“bogus messages” that Iran has chemical or nuclear weapons or that its agents planned to hit targets in
the West. 93

In the event of a terrorist attack against the U.S. or its interests abroad, accurately assigning
blame would be of paramount importance to avoid improper retaliation. This would require very careful
intelligence work that would be much easier should Tehran and Washington finally recognize their
convergence of interests and makes rational political choices.

Revolution Exportation
Dr. Houman Sadri defines a “radical revolutionary idealist” as one who has an extreme sense of
mission for exporting their revolution by any means. He goes on to add that what separates this type
from the rest of the idealists is that they do not confine themselves to employing rhetoric and spiritual
support as do most idealists. Rather, their goal is to send material, particularly military, support to
groups abroad with similar ideologies. Numerous American presidential administrations, including that
of President George W. Bush, have designated the spread of democracy as their principal foreign policy
objective positing the notion that nascent democracies will make the world a better and safer place for
Americans. Such mentalities fly in the face of democratic principles in their blatant disregard of the fact
that the imposition of any ideology via “gunboat diplomacy” is inherently undemocratic. As posited by
Dr. Sadri, romanticism and optimism blind the idealist to essential facts and such individuals are
simplistic and gullible in assuming that their particular revolution is actually exportable. By examining
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the foreign policies of both states one undeniable notion is elucidated; Iran and America are far more
alike in their revolutionary principles than they are different. Much like the American Revolution, the
Iranian Revolution of 1979 was an internal revolt driven by principles that were both spiritually and
culturally relevant to the populace. This point is highlighted by Dr. Sadri in that a revolution that is to be
legitimate, decisive, and successful must be deeply rooted within a particular society. 94 Both countries
are soon to discover at some cost that the fomentation of their revolutionary ideals and subsequent
attempts to export their respective ideologies, under a “one size fits all” rationale, is both foolish and
culturally insensitive – a ticking time bomb laden with far reaching consequences. This salient reality
makes the notion of the exportation of the Iranian revolution all the more absurd.

As indicated by Kenneth Timmerman, director of the Middle East Data Project Incorporated, the
Islamic Republic’s success in exporting its revolution is checkered at best. The revolution lost the bulk
of its legitimacy with the death of the Islamic regime’s founder – Ayatollah Khomeini. His successor,
Ali Khamenei, vitiated his predecessor’s goals primarily through his lack of charisma and religious
credentials. This is not to suggest that Tehran is innocent of subversive activities abroad. However the
Islamic Republic now utilizes more classical means of achieving foreign policy objectives in lieu of
ideology exportation. 95 Iran is a unique state beset by competing internal forces, clerical radicalism and
political pragmatism. Moderate politicians routinely struggle to consolidate power through appeasement
of hardliner clerics while at the same time attempting to establish normalized relations with the outside
world that are vital to the Iranian economy. Under the guidance of a supreme clerical leader, Iran is still
certainly guided by its Islamic values. Yet, Iran is fast becoming more politically pragmatic with the
realization that its revolution is clearly not exportable. International editor of United Press International,
Claude Salhani, has indicated that while Iran's clerical leadership has tried "to interest a number of
countries to follow in their footsteps, they ultimately failed.” “There is not one country that has adopted
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the Iranian system,” Salhani observes. He noted that Iran's revolution has been unsellable outside its
borders and now Iran is beginning to incrementally swing back towards a more moderate center. He has
urged the world to consider that although Iran has not genuinely embraced democracy, it is a very
different Iran from the one that ousted the Shah and hung those who dared oppose the Islamic
Revolution. Salhani posited that with a large young population born after the revolution, change will
continue apace. 96 While in Shiraz, this researcher took the opportunity to interview an electrical
engineer and Iranian historian, Parviz Rostaminezhad. Parviz had received his education in America and
was quick to note that Iran’s clerical governance was vastly unpopular and would be eroded
incrementally over time as newer generations whittled away at its rigid practices. “No one likes
dictatorship,” Parviz uttered while looking me directly in the eyes with searing conviction. However
Parviz cautioned that positive change would only endure if America engaged Iran politically, rather than
militarily, and supported a subsequent cultural revolution that would yield an enduring Iranian
democracy. 97

Hezbollah
According to Augustus Norton, the Iranian revolution provided a context for another
organization to emerge – Hezbollah – “the party of God.” 98 Hezbollah was the most clearly identifiable
echoing of the Iranian Revolution, which occurred after Israeli troops marched through Beirut to occupy
the heavily Shi’ite populated Lebanon. Reacting to Israel’s invasion and under the aegis of Iran’s
Revolutionary Guard Corps, a group of Shi’a Muslim clerics led by Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah
established Hezbollah to promote Islam and resist Western influences in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s
paradigm was evidently inspired by the Revolution of Iran, which had culminated in the overthrow of
Iran’s secular government in 1979. Iran also provided generous economic support and much needed
armaments. Hezbollah hoped that Iran, which was then fighting Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War, would be able
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to export its revolution to Lebanon. Hezbollah was a more radical alternative to Lebanon’s mainstream
Shi’a faction, known as the Amal movement that also sought greater power for Muslims in Lebanon. 99

When the Lebanese Civil War ended in 1990, Lebanon made the gradual transition towards
parliamentary rule. Hezbollah’s leaders argued that the group should try to achieve power through
politics, not just military action. Hezbollah and the Iranians then came to an agreement with the late
Syrian President Hafez Assad. Hezbollah agreed to suspend its domestic revolutionary activities in
exchange for the right to organize resistance to the Israeli Defense Forces in southern Lebanon.
Hezbollah also dropped its objections to a political system that bars Shi’ites from the presidency and
premiership and allots them only 21% of the seats in parliament. A noticeable paradigm shift also
occurred. Hezbollah’s discourse changed from religious to nationalist, characterizing its engagement of
Israel as a national liberation struggle rather than a holy war. 100

The manner in which Hezbollah has adapted itself politically suggests there will be no Iran-esque
theocracy in Lebanon.

Hezbollah no longer conforms to its initial goal of forcefully remodeling

Lebanon into an Islamic Republic. Rather than seeking to supplant the political hierarchy Hezbollah’s
leader, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, utilized his military experience and successes to make substantial
political gains. Upon assuming power in 1992, Nasrallah advocated strongly for Hezbollah to participate
in Lebanon’s confessional system. Although radicals argued that he had betrayed the revolutionary
principles of the group, Nasrallah insisted Hezbollah better served its interests by working within the
political system rather than expressing itself from the fringes. In 2004, Hezbollah had nine of the
twenty-seven seats reserved for Shi’ites in the 128-member Lebanese parliament; it also controlled three
additional seats held by allied parties and occupied, respectively, by a Christian and two Sunni.
Hezbollah has become deeply embedded into Lebanese society becoming socially democratic in their
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provision of social services such as hospitals and job training in the Shi’ite community. Hezbollah has
forged alliances across religious lines and is progressive in its levels of female activism. Nasrallah has
also publicly conceded that an Islamist State would require an overwhelming popular desire, which he
admits is not existent in Lebanon and probably never will be.
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Despite continuing support from Iran, it

is evident that Hezbollah operates in accordance with a nationalist paradigm and not as a revolutionary
extension of Iran. Support emanates from Iran not in support of shared Islamic goals, but rather in
furtherance of pragmatic political ends such as the ending of a reviled occupation and engagement of
Western endeavors via proxy elements.

Bosnia
When the Bosnian Muslims, who were also staunch allies of the West, were battling against the
rampaging Croats and Serbs the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) rendered assistance. Iran
and other Muslim countries supplied them with arms and training; the Iranians also participated in the
battle alongside Bosnian Muslim soldiers. Some have attempted to characterize the incident as an
attempt by Iran to export its revolution to Bosnia. However, similar to events in the recent invasion of
Afghanistan, the U.S. military and the IRGC interacted positively in Bosnia. The Bosnians were clearly
under siege and solicited the assistance of Iran. Subsequently, the IRGC trained and armed Bosnian
fighters with the tacit blessing of the Clinton Administration and Iran continued to provide humanitarian
support even after their military role ended. 102

According to Clinton Administration officials, the policy brought military pressure against the
Serbs into the equation in order to obtain a better political settlement. The Iranian option was the least
labor-intensive way of reaching that military equilibrium. The plan was successful in that working in
union with aggressive NATO air strikes Croatians and Bosnians ultimately dealt the Serbs compelling
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battlefield losses. 103 In November 1995 the Dayton Agreement was signed in Paris, calling for the exit
of foreign forces and ending the three and a half year war in Bosnia.

For most of Bosnia's Muslims, the relationship with Iran was pragmatic in that it was established
for the purposes of obtaining military assistance and had very little to do with religion or ideology.
Additionally, after pressure from the Clinton Administration, the Iranians were expelled from Bosnia
after their assistance was no longer needed. 104 That Tehran sought to expand its influence into Europe is
axiomatic. However, the Bosnian’s desire to be part of the European community eliminates the notion
of it becoming an Islamic republic and a pawn of Tehran.

Chechnya
There is no debating that Iran, like the rest of the Muslim world, sent aid to Muslim refugees in
Chechnya. However, in sharp contrast to criticism of Russian conduct from other parts of the Islamic
world, Tehran’s stance was relatively subdued in reaction to the war. Iran’s stance on the issue of
Chechnya is a primary example of Iran’s migration away from religious fundamentalism to political
pragmatism. Iran has consistently treated Chechnya as Russia’s internal matter and played an
instrumental role in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) to keep it from openly supporting
Chechen rebels. But why would an Islamic republic that has routinely been accused of attempting to
export its Islamic revolution to zones of conflict take the side of a non-Muslim state that has been
accused of assailing separatists on the basis of their religion?

Russia and Iran share many strategic interests in Central Asia, the Caspian and the Caucasus. In
the past, both countries worked bilaterally to end the civil war in Tajikistan in the 1990s and the Taliban
rule in Afghanistan. Both are major stakeholders bent upon maintaining peace and stability in Central
Asia and the Caucasus; increasingly alarmed in regard to the growing U.S. economic and military
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presence in the region. Russia is also Iran’s primary supplier of arms and technology. Gazprom, a
Russian natural gas monopoly is actively developing the South Pars field in Iran and is poised to assist
in the establishment of an Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. The Russian Railways company is involved
in a multinational project to build a 350-km line for the North-South Transport Corridor linking the town
of Astara on Azerbaijan’s border with Kazvin in Iranian territory. As the world’s largest holders of
natural gas reserves, both Russia and Iran support the notion of creating a gas OPEC. Iran also possesses
observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and is likely to become a member of an
energy club Russia is planning for the SCO. Russia and Iran share the same positions in that they wish to
limit the presence of outside powers in the Caspian region, namely the U.S. and its desire to control the
flow of energy from the region.105

For those who accuse Tehran of ideological exportation, Chechnya is clearly not a suitable
example. It has been Washington’s supposed ally, Saudi Arabia, which has historically been of the
largest supporters of Chechen separatism. According to a State Department official who requested
anonymity, between 1997 – 1999 alone, Saudi foundations and rich individuals have out poured over
$100 million to support Chechen separatism. Radical Chechen leaders, such as Movladi Udugov and
Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, have also found asylum in Saudi Arabia.106 Other than for humanitarian
assistance Tehran’s ruling clerics have been muted in their rhetoric and have noticeably aligned
themselves with Russia in this case. Not only does Tehran have numerous shared interests with Russia
in a regional sense, a cozy relationship with Moscow enables Iran to stymie Washington’s economic
sanctions and the endeavor to politically isolate Iran.
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Egypt
Egypt is not a state that borders Iran; however its regional clout in the Persian Gulf makes it
extremely significant in Tehran's geostrategic planning vis-à-vis American and Israeli pressure.
Ayatollah Khomeini severed relations with Egypt subsequent to the Iranian Revolution in 1979, when
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat came to peaceful terms with Israel and provided safe harbor to the
deposed Shah Pahlavi. As a result, Egypt tacitly backed the Iraqi invasion of Iran that it was aware was
supported by Washington. 107

It has been posited that Tehran has attempted to instigate Islamic groups in Egypt to depose its
leaders in a Khomeini-esque Islamic revolution. It is evident the Iranian revolution fomented a revival of
the political role of Islamic edifices, such as mosques and madrassahs, in the mobilization of politicallyoriented Islamic elements throughout the Muslim world. Certain Islamic actors in Egypt were impressed
by the proposed Iranian project of Islamic renaissance with its extra-national dimensions. However,
during the period following the Iranian revolution, certain political Islamic actors in Egypt began to
change their positions on the revolution. A negative attitude toward Shiism was fostered by a plethora of
anti-Shi’ite publications which discredited the Islamic credentials of Shi’ites and questioned the true
intentions of the "Shi’ite" Iranian revolution. Islamic Associations in Egyptian universities soon
affirmed their ideological differences with the Shi’ite nature of the Iranian revolution, indicating they
would rebuff support offered by Iran being that such support might be ostensibly one of Islamic
solidarity with the true intention of imposing ideological hegemony. 108

Egypt and Iran resumed relations in the late 1980’s albeit at a very low level. However, in
February 2008 Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced he would be traveling to Egypt
after accepting an invitation from Cairo. Such a visit would be the first time an Iranian president has
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entered Egypt since ties were severed and communication occurred only at minimal levels of diplomatic
contact. 109 This recent thaw is an unprecedented act of diplomacy for Iran, being that cozying itself up to
Egypt breaks new ground in the realm of Iranian foreign policy. Evidently, Tehran is actively
endeavoring to divide the coalition of conservative Arab states that the Western alliance is intent on
consolidating against Iran with Israeli participation.

Iran’s revolution could never be exported to Egypt due primarily in part to schismatic religious
differences – the Sunni/Shia divide. Both Cairo and Tehran will encounter overwhelming internal voices
of opposition from their respective hardliner elements. Diplomatic relations between the two countries
are clearly politically pragmatic and not sought on the basis of religious ideology. Tehran again
strengthens it policy of non-alignment and further stymies Washington’s efforts to regionally isolate it.
Egypt benefits from Iran’s counterweight to Israel as well, as using Iran’s stance as a model for its
pursuit of nuclear technology for its economic and electricity needs. 110

Nuclear Technology
Due to their concerns over an Iranian nuclear weapons program, Washington and a few of its
allies have failed to acknowledge Iran's legitimate pursuit of a nuclear energy program. Washington’s
containment policies and bellicose rhetoric have emboldened Tehran and only further encouraged its
nuclear endeavors. It can be argued that Washington’s coercive approach has enabled Iran to become
increasingly independent and has fostered warming relations with China and Russia – both states
capable of providing Iran with advanced nuclear technology. The attempt to prevent Iran from obtaining
nuclear technology is evidently futile and also blatantly ignores Tehran’s legitimate energy concerns.
Recent history has witnessed the Middle East becoming increasingly volatile, which all the more calls
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for a substantial change in American foreign policy towards Iran. Meaningful dialogue with Tehran is
absolutely necessary in order to prevent Iran from becoming all the more intimidated and further
developing its nuclear technology for military applications.

Washington’s Complicity
The current Bush Administration either banks upon a historically myopic electorate or has
succumbed to a peculiar case of collective amnesia. Both Republican and Democratic administrations in
Washington supported Shah Pahlavi’s elaborate plans to make nuclear power an integral part of Iran's
domestic energy apparatus. This was due in large part to Pahlavi’s willingness to purchase the bulk of
his nuclear equipment from the United States. Iran's first research reactor was established by the U.S. in
1967 at Tehran University. Later that same year a U.S. corporation, United Nuclear, provided Iran with
5.85 kilograms of 93 percent enriched uranium. In the 1970’s Washington continued to countenance
Shah Pahlavi’s nuclear development in Iran on the basis of its growing energy demands and finite
amount of natural resources. President Gerald Ford's Administration, for which Kissinger was Secretary
of State, backed Iran's nuclear endeavors. It was posited that Tehran should "prepare against the
time…about 15 years in the future…when Iranian oil production is expected to decline sharply."
General Electric and Westinghouse ultimately acquired contracts to establish eight new reactors in Iran.
By the late 1970’s, just prior to the Islamic revolution, Shah Pahlavi had intentions of purchasing a total
of eighteen nuclear power reactors from the United States, France, and Germany.
Washington had full intentions of selling billions of dollars worth of nuclear reactors, spare parts
and nuclear fuel to Iran. It is most important to note that Pahlavi ran a brutal dictatorship unfettered by
democratic elections or an independent judiciary. The National Security and Intelligence Organization
(SAVAK), the Shah’s secret police, was notorious for arbitrarily torturing and murdering political
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dissidents. The Shah also made no secret of plans to possibly militarize his nuclear program.
Washington wasn’t concerned at the least about an Iranian nuclear program in the 1970’s; actually
encouraging Iran to enrich its own uranium. Despite his regional ambitions Washington was not
concerned as long as the Shah fulfilled important roles for his Washingtonian benefactors. In that
respect, Pahlavi acted as regional gendarme for the U.S. and ensured a steady flow of petroleum to U.S.
and other western oil companies. 111

Iran’s Legitimate Need
When its war ended with Iraq in 1988, Iran was experiencing a massive population increase.
Iran's population reached 70-million people mid-2006, which represented 16 percent of the Mid-East's
444-million inhabitants. According to data released by the Population Reference Bureau (PRB), Iran's
population alone will reach 89 million by 2025. According to the same source, Iran will also have a
population of 102 million people in 2050. 112 Iran's energy planners understood that demand would
ultimately far exceed supply. Iran’s current level of oil and natural gas exploitation would not be
sufficient to meet electricity demands. An analysis by a scientist in the National Academy of Sciences
presaged that Iran might deplete its exportable oil by 2015. 113 Its population growth rate and finite
amount of resources suggest strongly that Iran cannot possibly rely exclusively on oil and gas for its
energy needs. Due in large part to Washington’s unilateral sanctions that deter foreign investment, Iran’s
aging oil industry has been unable even to match anywhere near the pre-revolution oil production level
of 5.5 million barrels per day. Of Iran's 60 major oil fields, 57 need substantial repairs, upgrades and repressurizing; this would require $40 billion over a period of 15 years. Iran's current production level of
3.5 million barrels daily is increasingly geared toward domestic consumption, which has expanded by
more than 280 percent since the 1979 revolution. If this trend continues, Iran will eventually become a
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net oil importer by 2010. This would be a catastrophe for a country that relies on oil for 80 percent of its
foreign income and 45 percent of its annual budget.

It is routinely argued that Iran sits on a mountain of natural resources and should obtain
electricity from natural gas-fired power plants that are allegedly more efficient. Experts have posited
that this argument is wholly without merit. Professors from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) conducted research that indicated the cost of producing electricity from gas or oil is comparable
with the price tag of generating electricity with nuclear reactors. Gas and oil processes also produce
carbon emissions which adversely effect the environment. Nuclear reactors would provide Iran with a
renewable energy resource and allow it to focus upon maximizing its profits as a main supplier of
energy to Asia and Europe. Although nuclear energy will not resolve Iran’s energy issues, it represents a
significant move towards diversification of its domestic energy sources. 114

Nuclear Iran: Why Now?
Washington legitimately condemned the Taliban giving it ultimatums that were met with noncompliance. Ultimately, the U.S. invaded Afghanistan and deposed the ruling Taliban regime.
Washington also made many demands of Saddam Hussein and despite a lack international consensus, it
unilaterally invaded Iraq. Subsequently, Saddam was turned over to the Iraqi’s who tried, convicted and
marched him off to the gallows. Iran now has long been the target of U.S. saber-rattling regarding its
role in a so-called “axis of evil,” and a being a sponsor of terrorism. Hawks in Washington also
frequently utilize rhetoric such as “regime change” and the “military option” when discussing foreign
policy towards Iran. Tehran has not only found itself surrounded by an ardent wall of U.S. military
occupation, it has also witnessed two regimes at its northern and southern borders deposed by the United
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States. It is without question that nuclear weapons would deter Washington from attempting to invade
Iran as an extension of its “war on terror” in the Middle East. For hardliners in Iran, such as
Ahmadinejad, nuclear weapons are seen as a legitimate means of defending Iran from what he must
perceive to be a menacing and powerful regional presence. Iran’s hostile rhetoric, namely towards Israel,
is evidently a maneuver to incite nationalist sentiment and divert domestic dissatisfaction away from
Tehran; directing it towards the United States and its allies.
Evidently Tehran seeks to develop its nuclear technology for legitimate energy needs, security
and the prestige associated with such an accomplishment. For obvious reasons the global community
must react with due care. That Iran has legitimate needs for nuclear power is self-evident and the
international community must gain a rational consensus on this matter. In Tehran I interviewed Mehrdad
Hemmatyar, an Iranian steel merchant routinely sidelined by U.S. sanctions. Although Hemmatyar made
a good living selling steel to the Chinese he longed for an end to the U.S. sanctions so that his country
could once again profit from dealings with the Americans. “History suggests we should not trust the
Russians, and the Chinese are only engaging us for selfish economic ends,” he stated before going on to
add, “We Iranians have so much in common with the American’s. We legitimately need each other and
now circumstances indicate that we should become partners in many aspects.” Hemmatyar indicated that
a diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue would enable Iran to develop its nuclear energy program and
put an end to the routine rolling blackouts in Tehran. Hemmatyar noted that the U.S. once supported an
Iranian nuclear program and that Washington must be fully aware that Iran will ultimately become a
nuclear power. He asserted that as a nuclear power Iran would not be a threat to Israel and a nuclear
armed Iran would merely guarantee that neither side would benefit from attacking the other.115
Moderate elements in Iran are politically pragmatic and are endeavoring to reconcile Tehran’s
ruling theocracy with modernity. The clerical establishment is vastly unpopular and a fast swelling,
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college educated younger generation will ultimately erode the clerical grip on Iran’s governance.
However, moderate elements are only further marginalized by hostile rhetoric and policies of
containment towards Iran. That Iran will eventually develop itself in a nuclear sense is not a looming
threat for the world outside its borders. Historically speaking, nuclear powers have never considered
invasion or all out war with each other. Stalemate or diplomatic resolutions are the usual outcomes.
Most in the Middle East are quite aware that had Saddam Hussein actually developed a nuclear weapons
program, he would likely still be alive and lording over Iraq today. However, he has passed from
existence and the American flag now waves indefinitely over Baghdad. Any examination of this issue,
unobscured by political or personal biases, suggests that Iran’s pursuit of nuclear energy is wholly
warranted. That Iran would additionally seek to develop a nuclear arsenal and become a member of the
nuclear guild is not an irrational pursuit – it makes complete sense.
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CHAPTER 4: SYSTEM LEVEL EXAMINATION

America has many interests in common with the government of Iran and its populace. On the
basis of regional endeavors, the United States and Iran are natural allies. Washington and Tehran have a
shared interest in free access to the Persian Gulf and the free movement of oil out of that area. More
important, both have a shared interest in stability in Afghanistan and Iraq. Both also have a common
interest in every effective way to stopping the flow of narcotics from Afghanistan into Iran, Western
Europe and the United States. 116

Washington & Tehran – Strategic Allies
The United States has done a huge service for Iran. It has removed the Taliban to the east and
Saddam Hussein to the west, Iran’s two greatest enemies and its greatest security threats. The United
States has, in fact, given the Islamic Republic a very comfortable space to operate on the international
scene; significantly more than it possessed before. Iran is quite active in southern Afghanistan. It is a big
donor in building roads and other public projects. On the Iraqi side, the Iranians have been extremely
helpful. They were the first country in the world to recognize the governing council set up by the United
States. They are pursuing what they regard as a very enlightened policy in Iraq. They are offering
petroleum products across the border, and they are opening their borders to trade. There are
approximately 50,000 tourists in Iraq on any given occasion, traveling there primarily to visit the holy
sites at Najaf and Karbala, which were previously closed to Iranian pilgrims for many years. Tehran was
also very helpful in establishing the governing council and convincing the Shi’ite elements to cooperate
in Iraq. In return for these efforts, the Islamic Republic was rewarded with Bush’s “axis of evil”
speech. 117
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Afghanistan
Tehran is inherently at odds with the Taliban's malevolent anti-Shi'ite ideology – ironically this
was the primary impetus for Saudi Arabia and the U.S. supporting the Taliban movement in the mid1990’s. The Taliban massacred Shi'ites in the Hazarajat region and in northern Afghanistan during its
years in power in Kabul; among the thousands some were actually buried alive. As mentioned earlier, in
Mazar-i-Sharif in 1997, the Taliban executed eight Iranian diplomats, which brought Tehran close to
engaging the Taliban militarily.
It is no secret that Iran has actively supported the Northern Alliance. Tehran not only rendered
huge amounts of material and military assistance to the Northern Alliance groups, an Iranian special
envoy, Alae'ddin Broujerdi, was a frequent visitor to the Amu Darya region and Panjshir Valley for the
purpose of blandishing the anti-Taliban resistance. It was Broujerdi's persuasive skills that
overshadowed the petty conflicts and turf wars amongst Northern Alliance groups and united them
against the Taliban. Although American occupation of Afghanistan was irreconcilable with Tehran’s
vital interests and core concerns, it put aside its differences with Washington. Because Afghanistan's
long-term stability is of utmost concern to Tehran, it pragmatically supported the invasion. 118
Despite their dramatic international struggle over Iran's pursuit of nuclear technology, Tehran
and Washington briefly put aside their enmity and cooperated rather well in Afghanistan – a place where
interests converge. Members of Iran's Revolutionary Guards fought alongside and advised the Afghan
rebels who helped U.S. forces topple Afghanistan's Taliban regime in the months after the Sept. 11
terrorist attacks. James Dobbins, a former State Department official who worked with diplomats from
Iran and other Afghan neighbors to create the first post-Taliban government, says the Iranians “were
equipping and paying the Northern Alliance. Russia and India were also helping, but at the time, Iran
was the most active.” After the fall of the Taliban, Iran offered to help train and equip a new Afghan
army, Dobbins says. That offer was rebuffed by the Bush Administration. 119
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Despite preexisting tensions, Afghanistan is a fine example of how U.S. and Iranian interests can
constructively align in the Islamic world. Tehran aligned itself with the Northern Alliance in its struggle
against al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime, and had been financing opposition to the Taliban and Usama
bin Laden long before the United States considered the invasion of Afghanistan. 120 Tehran later allowed
the United States military to use its airspace during the course of the post 9/11 invasion. 121 In a gesture
to openly display its full backing of the fragile post-Taliban government, Iran capitulated to Washington
in 2002 by closing the office of dissident Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who subsequently left
Iran. 122 The Iranian government also pledged $560 million in development aid to President Hamid
Karzai's government since 2002, half of which has already been administered. Afghan-Iranian relations
have proven to be crucial, due to Tehran's economic and political influence inside Afghanistan. Former
Secretary of State James Baker III, in unveiling the Iraq Study Group's recommendations on how to
improve the situation in Iraq, pointed to Afghanistan as a possible model for U.S.-Iran cooperation in
Iraq. This statement was supported by Iranian cooperation with Washington in Bonn, where during the
course of an international conference they helped establish the Karzai government. “They were, in many
ways, our principal collaborators at that meeting,” said James Dobbins, President Bush's envoy to the
gathering. Dobbins indicated that the Iranian envoy, Javad Zarif, persuaded the Northern Alliance to
share power with other factions, a crucial step in establishing Karzai's government. 123 However, after
Tehran’s cooperation during the course of the invasion of Afghanistan and Afghan President Hamid
Karzai’s subsequent election, Washington discouraged Karzai from seeking intimate ties with Iran.
Although Iran was publicly praised by the United States for their positive role in Afghanistan it soon
found itself again vilified in Bush’s “axis of evil” speech. Washington not only perplexed Tehran, but
erased many of the political opportunities previously dangling at Washington’s fingertips. 124
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Regardless of the breakdown in U.S. / Iranian ties, Tehran has continued to push ahead with
development projects in Afghanistan, albeit amid little interaction with the American presence there. Its
investments have helped make the country's western and central regions among the most stable there, in
contrast with Afghanistan's south and east, where Taliban insurgents have heightened attacks on NATO,
U.S. and Afghan forces in recent months, say Afghan officials and businessmen. 125 Iran continues to
effect positive changes within Afghanistan as it projects its influence into the bordering region. Afghan
cities, such as Herat, are now enjoying the luxury of uninterrupted electricity and impeccably paved
highways. United States officials have largely attributed this stunning development at Iran’s periphery to
Tehran’s largesse. 126 However, in August of 2007 President Bush took issue with Afghan President
Hamid Karzai’s characterization of Iran as a “helper” in Afghanistan. President Bush pointedly
disagreed stating, “I would be very cautious about whether the Iranian influence in Afghanistan is a
positive force.” Yet a recent national intelligence estimate concluded that the al-Qaeda network had
reconstituted itself and was reengaging coalition forces. However, al-Qaeda had not found refuge in Iran
rather the mountainous territory in neighboring Pakistan 127 – a so-called “ally” in the war against the
Taliban. Those scrutinizing Iran’s conduct in Afghanistan will find they are extremely challenged in
uncovering evidence of misconduct. Objective researchers ultimately concede that Iran, despite its
policies elsewhere, has proven to be a benevolent neighbor to Afghanistan.
Amid tensions over Iran's nuclear ambitions and alleged support for militants, Afghanistan
remains one of the opportunities for Washington and Tehran to mend the relations cut off since 1979.
Both Iran and the United States share a common goal: to eliminate the Taliban and establish a stable
post-Taliban political order in Afghanistan. Apparent post 9/11 cooperation demonstrated to Afghan
warlords they could not play America and Iran off one another and mutual concerns compelled Tehran
to deport hundreds of suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban operatives who had fled Afghanistan. While
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America and Iran worked together, Afghanistan was much more stable than it is today, al-Qaeda was on
the run, the Islamic Republic's Hezbollah protégé was comparatively restrained, and Tehran was not
spinning centrifuges. Oddly, the Bush Administration conveyed no interest in building on these positive
trends. 128 Furthermore, Washington’s alienation of Iran via economic sanctions and “regime change”
rhetoric threatens to erase the substantial progress made in Afghanistan, the primary battlefield in the
“war on terror”. Mohammad Reza Bahrami, Iran's Ambassador to Afghanistan has indicated, “The
disagreements we have with the international community do not have a place in Afghanistan,” he went
on to add, “Our understanding for Afghanistan is that it can be a good model for cooperation among the
international community.” 129
As will be seen in the following pages, Washington must seize the opportunity to move forward
decisively toward strategic engagement with Iran. This will ensure success in its efforts to pacify violent
elements and stabilize the environments inside Iran’s neighboring countries. Iran remains a partner vital
to this endeavor by virtue of its shared culture, language, geographic location and early cooperation. It is
not prudent to discard a potential ally with a demonstrated history of successfully pursuing its interests
unilaterally within Afghanistan. It is important to note that Tehran could have elected to sideline itself as
America toppled the Taliban, overtly abstaining to side with the “Great Satan” in the eyes of the Muslim
world. Instead, Tehran cooperated with Washington’s efforts in Afghanistan and sided with the West
against the Taliban. Why would a government that has been labeled as “fanatical” by many U.S.
politicos assist the United States in a war against Muslim extremists? The Iranians were hoping that their
assistance in Afghanistan would have strategic implications with an entire new relationship between
Tehran and Washington as the ultimate outcome. “Iran made a mistake not to link its assistance in
Afghanistan to American help in other areas and by just hoping that the U.S. would reciprocate,” said
Javad Zarif, Iran's United Nations ambassador who was in charge of negotiations with Washington over
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Afghanistan. 130 The aforementioned activities overwhelming suggest that Tehran evidently desires
normalized relations with Washington, which would also allow it to interact much more freely with the
rest of the Western world.

Iraq
Since the toppling of Saddam Hussein and his Ba’athist regime, Iraq is a state that has gone from
bad to worse. The occupying force, the United States, claims to have a plan for success, but as the death
toll continues to mount it is increasingly evident that Washington may have unwittingly opened
Pandora's Box in the Arab World. The U.A.E. Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mohammed
Hussain Al Sha'ali, indicated that his country historically looked upon the United States as a role model.
However in his opinion, the war in Iraq appears to have been executed without a great deal of advanced
planning. “Our countries tried to advise the U.S. not to go in to Iraq without a plan,” Sha'ali recounted,
“Because of arrogance no one was willing to listen to advice from the region. Military might should be
couched in wisdom. The U.S. didn't analyze the situation before invading. They dismantled the country's
education, health care and security system.” In the wake of this invasion, U.S. occupation authorities
eliminated Iraqis' jobs and tried to govern and police an entire country. As a result, Iraqis who lived in
peace together for thousands of years became divided and headed for civil war. 131
Amidst tensions between Tehran and Washington lurk mutual concerns and powerful incentives
to cooperate in order to back away from the precipice of deadly military confrontation. Washington is
fast learning the unilateralism that enabled it to swiftly enter Iraq and dispose of Saddam, is now
somewhat ineffective in managing the complex situation that has unfolded during the occupation. The
United States now faces a stark choice. It must either escalate its confrontational policy with Iran or
adopt a policy of engagement. Far from arresting the Iranian danger, escalation would most likely

66

present the United States with new perils. Given the balance of power in the region, a continued
confrontational course with Iran would saddle the United States with the protracted commitment of
setting up camp in the Persian Gulf indefinitely and deploying to other conflict zones in an environment
of increasing radicalism. It would place the United States at the heart of the region's conflicts, leaving it
all the more vulnerable to ideological extremism and terrorism at home and abroad. An American
conflict with Iran would also undermine regional stability, jeopardize the economic gains of the Persian
Gulf emirates and inflame Muslim public opinion. Persistent clashes with the United States will
radicalize the Iranian theocracy and, more important, the Iranian public. 132
A crucial factor for stability in Iraq is cooperative relations between Iran and the United States.
For the first time in Iraq’s history, the Arab-Sunni minority has been forced out of power and has been
replaced, at least for the present time, by the Shi’ite majority. The success of this historical
reconstruction of Iraq’s political system will depend largely on cooperation between the U.S. and
neighboring countries, namely Iran. The decades-long political repression and economic discrimination
against the Shi’ites will come to an end and Iraq’s new face is certain to have significant regional
implications. However success will not materialize without the reduction of tension realized through
cooperative relations between the United States and Iran. 133 Tehran / Washington rapprochement would
serve to foment stability in Iraq, where both parties evidently support the same Shi’ite-led government.
In February 2007 a powerful senior Iraqi Shi’ite leader, Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, indicated his country had
urged Iran to hold talks with the United States and that such talks were important for the security of the
region. 134 Further cooperation should entail the U.S. curtailing is projection of power towards Iran in the
Persian Gulf, ceasing its calls upon the international community to not invest in Iran, and proactively
bringing Iran into multilateral endeavors confronting Middle Eastern affairs. As a part of its new
diplomatic approach, Washington must also encourage stabilizing Iranian influence in bordering states
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and cease casting an enemy image for Iran with language that labels Iran as a main protagonist in an
''axis of evil'' or the “central banker of terrorism”. In light of many years of sanctions, containment, and
inflammatory accusations, the time has come to realize that such measures are wholly incapable of
moderating Iran's behavior.
In September 2006, former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami criticized both Ahmadinejad
and President Bush for using intemperate language that has heightened tensions, “A politician must
conduct himself at the highest level of etiquette and diplomacy.” On the topics of sanctions and military
action Khatami went on to state, “Sanctions and, even worse than that, military action will only serve to
complicate the issue, not solve the problem.” He further indicated that despite the change in the
leadership, Iran was not the enemy of the United States and that the two countries share strategic
interests in Iraq and Afghanistan. 135 Both Tehran’s moderate voices and history of foreign policy
practices reveal that the Islamic Republic is quite capable and willing to mitigate its ideology with
pragmatism. 136
The Bush Administration is facing increasing domestic and international pressure to pursue
Iranian assistance in pacifying sectarianism in Iraq. British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Australian
Premier John Howard have indicated they favor engaging Iran and Syria in order to develop effective
measures to reduce the level of violence in Iraq; a stance increasingly shared by many influential U.S.
lawmakers from both parties. 137 By engaging Iran in order to pursue the stabilization of Iraq, the Bush
Administration could also open additional avenues of dialogue leading to further rapprochement. To
continue on its quest to halt the sectarian violence only to meet further failure would leave Iran feeling
more confident and less inclined to assist the United States in minimizing its losses. 138 The key to
Washington freeing itself of the Iraqi quagmire is to do what the current Presidential administration has
refused to do all along: link Iranian cooperation in Iraq to Washington's willingness to find a
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compromise on the nuclear issue. Neither Congress nor a pragmatist in charge of the Pentagon is likely
to change the course on Iraq and Iran unless the President recognizes the reality on the ground: without
Iran, the U.S. cannot win in Iraq, and without linking Iraq to the nuclear issue, Tehran is not likely to
cooperate. 139 Such compromise with Iran would ultimately serve as the most viable exit strategy from
Iraq, leaving the door open for future political and economic relations with Tehran.

Opium: Iran and U.S. Interests Converge Again
The cultivation and production of opium in Afghanistan have skyrocketed since the U.S. deposed
the Taliban in 2001. It is said that Afghanistan now supplies 92 percent of the world’s illicit opium. The
rapidly expanding opium apparatus now threatens to destabilize the Afghan government and transform
the embattled country back into sanctuary for drug traffickers and terrorists. 140 Drug traffickers have
characterized Iran as part of the “golden route”, an opium smuggling trail that extends from Afghanistan
into Pakistan and then into eastern Iran. From Iran opium, and its derivative heroin, ultimately makes its
way into western markets. Afghanistan’s drug cultivation and trafficking is somewhat pervasive and its
proceeds also enrich certain elements allied with Washington. A senior U.S. Pentagon official, who has
been involved in the reorganization of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan to effectively pitch them
against the Taliban, admitted the drug economy in Afghanistan was more powerful than the actual
economy. However, the route has become a lucrative funding source for the Taliban resistance whose
other sources of financing have been nearly eliminated due to the “war on terror”. 141
Iran has the highest rate of heroin and opium addiction per capita. According to the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime UNODC, of Iran's 70 million people more than 4 million are
addicted to drugs. This addiction cuts across educational, class, age and economic barriers. Experts
claim that Middle-aged professionals and academics are as vulnerable as under-educated, socially
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deprived teenagers. Iran is plagued by the movement of drugs flowing in through its eastern and western
borders, as well as its southern seaports. Overwhelming quantities of opium and heroin are smuggled in
from Afghanistan, Pakistan and former Soviet republics such as Turkmenistan. Further exacerbating this
problem is an influx of hallucinogenic and chemical-based drugs, such as ecstasy, from Turkey and
through the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas.
Since the 1979 Islamic revolution, more than 2.6 million Iranians have been arrested on drug
offenses. Almost half the prison population is serving time for drug-related crimes. Iran’s police and
security forces have been engaged in a losing battle with drug smugglers. In 2003, the country's antidrug forces seized 220 tons of drugs, reckoned by the UN to be just a fraction of the amount entering the
country. Since the revolution, approximately 3,200 members of the security forces have been killed in
clashes with drug traffickers. 142 However Iran is not the only country that has a strong desire to eradicate
the opium apparatus firmly rooted in Afghanistan.
In September 2006, the UNODC published a survey on opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan,
which it said has risen 59 percent since 2005. The report characterized the 6,100 tons of opium
harvested in Afghanistan in 2006 as “unprecedented,” and claimed harvest revenues are likely to exceed
$3 billion. On the heels of the U.N. report, Thomas Schweich of the U.S. State Department issued a
statement to reporters in Brussels that U.S. officials believe aggressive eradication of opium poppies in
Afghanistan is crucial. John Waters, the White House drug control policy director, also noted that opium
poppy eradication endeavors have been successful in Mexico and South America. Both countries have
been the main suppliers of heroin to the United States. However he indicated that enforcement agencies,
such as the Drug Enforcement Administration, are concerned that opium emanating from Afghanistan
may ultimately fill the void. 143
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The void left by the removal of the Taliban from power in Afghanistan is being occupied by
corrupt officials, criminals, and terrorists. Furthermore, these elements are substantially subsidized by
the opium trade. The majority of Afghanistan delighted in the Taliban’s fall, however the weak central
government along with U.S. and NATO forces has been ineffective in establishing security or
ameliorating the quality of life in Afghanistan. Additionally, errant bullets and bombs have injured and
killed many innocent Afghans who have become increasingly disillusioned with U.S. and NATO forces.
Ironically, Afghans are now turning back to the Taliban in order to meet their security needs. The opium
crop is also a major source of funding for the Taliban insurgency.
The opium problem and security of Afghanistan are intimately linked and Iran must not be
precluded from this regional equation. Iran’s cultural, political, and religious clout has earned it a
position of unrivaled regional prominence. Iran has harbored close to two million Afghans either as
refugees or illegal immigrants. In addition to supplying Afghanistan electricity, Iran is also actively
building roads, schools and hospitals within the war-torn country. Iran has clearly made substantial
investments in Afghanistan. In the past it has offered support and assistance to the Northern Alliance
and has provided millions of dollars in aid after the toppling of the Taliban. Additionally, as its
neighbor, Iran has intimate historical and linguistic ties with Afghanistan. Washington has clearly
benefitted in the past from Iranian influence in Afghanistan. Afghan elements view Shi’ite Iran as an
ally and are predisposed to accepting Iranian political advice in regional affairs. The reality on the
ground such as the return of the Taliban, suggests that Washington must abandon its overly ambitious
goals and reengage Iran. It is important to stress that rapprochement with Iran does not constitute a
drastic overhaul of Washington’s initial strategy. Co-opting Iran simply reflects Washington’s ultimate
realization that it must recruit relevant regional players in order to establish a renewed sense of security
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in Afghanistan. As an alien regional player seeking to effect changes from abroad, the United States
must reestablish dialogue with Iran and cooperate with it in this important area of mutual interest.

The opium flow from Afghanistan is addressed by Iran primarily through interdiction. Recently,
Iran has increased its interdiction efforts, largely because of its increasing domestic addiction problem.
Iran has also lost several thousand troops in its efforts to guard its porous border with Afghanistan. 144
Iran’s commitment to preventing opium emanating from Afghanistan from reaching its citizens also
prevents the illicit substance from finding its way into Western markets.

The interdiction effort has become a dangerous business for Iran. In 2005 more than a quarter of
the drug seizures in Iran came by way of “armed clashes,” according to the Iranian Drug Control
Headquarters. Iranian security forces seem to be having increased success by concentrating their
interdiction efforts in the eastern provinces. The eastern provinces, specifically the southeast, are among
the poorest regions in Iran. The population there has made its living by smuggling for many years, even
prior to the 1979 Revolution. 145 Iran pursues an aggressive border interdiction effort and has invested as
much as $800 million in a system of elaborate counter-trafficking infrastructures such as patrol roads,
concrete dam constructions, ditches, sentry points, observation towers, barbed wire, electrified fences,
and even electronic surveillance devices. 30,000 law enforcement personnel man Iran’s borders with
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Iran says it spends $400 million annually on anti-drug operations. 146

The United States is equally concerned about the opium emanating from Afghanistan. However,
its primary role should be that of counter-insurgency and not so much counter-narcotics. Clearly
Afghanistan lacks a modicum of stability and without widespread security, counter-narcotics measures
will water down forces and would be hopelessly ineffective. Instability in Afghanistan represents a
looming danger for the Karzai government whose grip on power is tenuous at best. In the absence of
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stability, efforts to eradicate the illicit opium apparatus would only lead to adaptation and a strengthened
insurgency by the Taliban, which continues to dominate remote areas of Afghanistan.

Eradication and interdiction efforts within Afghanistan, on the part of the United States, are
accompanied by the risk of political fallout that could lead to more violence and instability. Aerial
spraying would also kill food crops some farmers plant alongside their poppies. Herbicidal spraying
could ultimately be characterized, namely by the Taliban, as American chemical warfare against the
Afghan peasantry. Ironically, officials at the Pentagon and Central Intelligence Agency have also
challenged the White House and State Department support for poppy eradication, raising concerns about
its potential to destabilize the Karzai government, current and former American officials have said. 147
Both Tehran and Washington have a shared interest in combating the illicit opium industry and
promoting the rule of law in Afghanistan. Both should provide financial aid, material support and
training in order to empower the Afghani central government to increase its eradication / interdiction
capacities as well as its ability to target criminal organizations and corrupt officials. Iran and the United
States are better equipped to work in unison to address the re-emerging insurgency while allowing the
Karzai government to police itself domestically.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps: “Pasdaran”
The Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini established the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),
or “Pasdaran”, in 1979. The clerical counterpart to the country's standing armed forces, the Pasdaran is
the Islamic Republic's principal ideological weapon.148 Although the Iranian Constitution entrusts the
military with guarding Iran's territorial integrity and political independence, it empowers the Pasdaran to
guard the integrity of the Iranian Republic’s revolutionary ideology. Specifically, the Pasdaran is to
assist the ruling clerics with the enforcement of the republic's Islamic codes and morality. The formation
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of the Pasdaran unified several paramilitary forces into a single force loyal to the new regime. The
Pasdaran was to function as a counter to the influence and power of the regular military and to disarm
non-Islamist members of the broad revolutionary coalition. Its sacrifices and gradual adoption of
classical warfare doctrines during the Iran-Iraq War enhanced its reputation as an efficient military force
and political influence soon followed. While discussion of the Pasdaran's cultural and religious activities
remains muted outside narrow academic circles, they are as real as its political activities. 149

The Iranian military is a powerful apparatus which, within the region, is commonly said to be
second only to Israel. However, the Iranian military is routinely spoken of in the media as a single
entity; a practice that is wholly inaccurate. Militarily speaking, Iran’s forces are comprised of three
different elements – the regular armed forces, the Law Enforcement Forces (LEF), and the Pasdaran
(IRGC). Like the Regular Iranian army, the Pasdaran has land, air and navy forces. The Pasdaran is also
comprised of a missile and special forces arm.

However the regular military is, in totality, much larger and a better-equipped apparatus than the
Pasdaran. The regular military is comprised of approximately 400,000 active duty members while the
Pasdaran has only 120,000. Pasdaran land forces are significantly smaller and less armed than their
regular army counterparts. The regular army is also better equipped in comparison. The bulk of Iran's
200 or so operational “high performance” combat aircraft are owned by the regular air force in contrast
to the Pasdaran’s few dozen trainer aircraft. The Pasdaran navy consists of 10 Chinese Houdong class
missile boats and more than 100 small boats, shore-based anti-ship missile batteries, and a large combat
swimmer (naval special warfare) force. Iran’s regular navy controls a dozen major surface combatant
ships and three submarines. Although relatively small in stature, the Pasdaran is a key institution in Iran
today due to its role as “guardian of the revolution” and the fact that many senior Pasdaran commanders
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have close personal and family links to powerful members of Iran's clerical establishment.
Consequentially, the Pasdaran has assured itself a crucial role in the selection, ideological indoctrination,
professional development, and advancement of future senior officers. 150 Despite their differences, all
three military arms are under the direction of the Supreme Leader of Iran, who has a representative in
charge of each of the three arms. This diaspora of military power within Iran is an outgrowth of the
Iranian Islamic revolution in 1979. For obvious reasons, the nascent clerical regime was suspicious of
the regular armed military which had previously supported the Peacock throne. As a result, the Pasdaran
were constitutionally entrenched as an ideological counterweight to the regular armed forces. The
regular army is solely committed to protecting Iranian territory, independence and general order within
the country. The Pasdaran protect the “purity” of Islamic theology practiced in Iran.

As the most ideologically committed arm of the Islamic regime not only was the Pasdaran
established to discourage notions of a future military coup, it has also become one of the main political
and economic players in the country. In actuality, the Pasdaran has become somewhat of a franchise
chain rather than a corporation controlled by a board of directors. This aspect of the Pasdaran
necessitates a sophisticated approach when foreign actors endeavor to engage it. The Pasdaran is divided
into five commands, each of which has a direct line to the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, also one of
the earliest members of the force in 1980. Of the five commands that make up the Pasdaran, only two
could be regarded as “terrorist” according to the U.S. State Department’s definition. The first, which
includes the so-called “Quds” Corps, is responsible for the exportation of the “Islamic Revolution”.
Apart from Hezbollah and Hamas this command coordinates a number of radical groups across the
globe. The second command that is radical in nature deals with internal repression. It operates through
several auxiliary forces, including the notorious “Karbala” brigades charged with crushing popular
revolts in Tehran. A majority of the Iranian populace perceive these as instruments of terror. 151 Parallel
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to the regular army, the Pasdaran also control the “Basij Mustadafin” (mobilization of the dispossessed),
a zealously ideological, semi-voluntary force of 90,000 full-time fighters and 2 million reserves. It is
said this force could be expanded to 11 million according to its commander General Mohammad Hejazi.
Their role is to combat internal enemies of the revolution and ensure that Islamic law is respected.
Pasdaran membership is said to stand at approximately 125,000 members. Its officers’ corps, including
retired members, is comprised of 55,000 individuals who are said to be as divided on domestic and
foreign policies as the Iranian populace. 152 During the course of my field research in Iran, Bita Molkava
was quick to point out members of the Basij Mustadafin, whom she referred to as “Basijis”. Under the
control of local mosques, these individuals wore regular clothes and were known to patrol public areas
monitoring the conduct of Iranians. Molkova indicated their domestic spying had noticeably increased
after the election of hardliner President Ahmadinejad. Although Molkova stated she highly favors the
end of hair covering and other social codes, she cautioned against the notion of immediate change.
Molkova favored gradual, rather than abrupt change, which she felt would inevitably occur over the
course of diplomatic relations (political and economic) with the west. 153 Mehrdad Hemmatyar also noted
that containment, sanctions, and harsh rhetoric from the west – namely Washington – had occasioned
the elections of hardliner figures that ratcheted up enforcement of morality codes. For Hemmatyar, the
Pasdaran is a tool of the clerical apparatus to prevent Western values from taking root and endangering
their grip on political power. He too asserted that engagement, rather than abrupt regime change, would
ultimately lead to the moderation of the clerical apparatus. 154 Reactionary in nature, it is surmised the
Pasdaran would evolve during the course of the moderation of the Islamic Republic. Despite its
oppressive practices, through the years the Pasdaran has provided Iranians with an effective vehicle not
only to advance themselves socially, but also economically and politically as well.
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The Pasdaran has established a domineering economic empire that has made it a financially
independent segment of Iran’s power elite. This empire entails a vast array of financial and economic
enterprises, from trading corporations to huge public works projects. Following the 1980-88 Iran/Iraq
war, the Pasdaran was directed to assume control over a majority of the country’s reconstruction. In
furtherance of the endeavor, the Pasdaran established the “Construction Jihad”. This event enabled the
Pasdaran to become a formidable actor within the Iranian economic sector. In 1983, the Supreme
Defense Council authorized the Pasdaran to set up its own military industries. This ended the U.S.
sponsored monopoly of the regular armed forces over domestic arms production and repair industries.
Over the course of a few years, the Pasdaran operated a growing defense industry which currently
produces a vast array of military weapons; from ballistic missiles to automatic rifles. Washington’s arms
embargos have had the opposite effect, enabling Iran to become increasingly self sufficient. In the face
of sanctions and embargos, the Pasdaran has actively endeavored to limit the penetration of foreign
contractors into Iran’s economy, positing that they constitute a security risk or have business dealings
with Israel. Washington’s containment policies hobbled reformists, such as former President
Mohammed Khatami who favored opening up the economy to badly needed outside investment during
the period between 1997 and 2005. The Pasdaran’s widening economic reach can be attributed, for the
most part, to Washington’s historical aversion to rapprochement with Iran. As a result, the Pasdaran
have been able to dramatically expand their activities. Through its companies, the Pasdaran has become
involved in a diverse array of activities, from small road, dam, and tunnel projects to petroleum
production and major construction projects across the country.
In 2006, “Khatam al-Anbiya” secured deals worth at least $7 billion in the oil, gas, and
transportation sectors, among others. 155 Said to be the “engineering arm” of the Pasdaran, in June 2007
“Khatam-al-Anbia” was awarded a $2.09 billion contract to develop the huge South Pars offshore gas
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field. Around the same period, the Pasdaran was awarded a $1.2 billion contract to construct a 900
kilometer pipeline linking the South Pars field to southeastern Iran to provide domestic gas. Developing
the South Pars gas field is a significant economic endeavor that will enable the exploitation of Iran’s
vast gas reserves. Second on the globe only to Russia’s gas reserves, the Pars development project will
be Tehran’s money-train as oil reserves are depleted. The Pasdaran’s footprint in South Pars highlights
its overt penetration into Iran’s sacrosanct energy sector and further broadens its growing political
power. In addition, the Pasdaran recently procured Iran’s largest private oil company, Oriental Kish, for
approximately $90 million. Sources indicate the Pasdaran are involved in approximately 250 additional
projects worth a total of $2.8 billion, including a new port terminal for shipping petrochemicals, while
1,220 projects worth between $2.7 billion and $3.2 billion have been completed. The impact of the
Pasdaran’s growing economic power is heightened by the control that the regime’s financial oligarchs,
dominated by the influential League of Islamic Associations, exert over state and non-state institutions.
These include a collaborative of powerful semi-government, supposedly philanthropic, foundations
known as “bonyads”, which control assets worth billions of dollars. These financial reserves have also
enabled the Pasdaran to allegedly fund covert operations. Its economic brawn has enabled the Pasdaran
to build up an ideological franchise throughout the republic, which provides funding independent of the
state. 156
Overtly religious, nationalistic, and battle-trained since 1980, the Pasdaran has emerged as a
critical force in determining Iran's national security strategy. In a post-Khomeini era, the Pasdaran is
more often displaying its ability to wield enormous power to approve or disapprove governmental
changes. Close relations with the highest political authorities have enabled Pasdaran enterprises to win
lucrative building and other contracts in non-competitive bidding. 157 However, Pasdaran officials have
also utilized their access to the Revolutionary Council and Khomeini as a stepping-stone to higher
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offices. Both President Khamenei and Majlis speaker Hashemi-Rafsanjani were previously commanders
within the Pasdaran. 158 The Pasdaran have been incrementally gathering political power with the passing
of Ayatollah Khomeini 1989. This activity became especially pronounced when its current commander,
Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi, assumed control in 1997. The Pasdaran’s economic and political
clout was significantly augmented in June 2005 with the surprise election of the fiery populist Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, a former Pasdaran commander, to the Iranian presidency. Many who are historically
dependent upon the Pasdaran to maintain political power, such as militant ideologues and conservative
clerics, operated in roles that were critical to ensuring Ahmadinejad’s election. 159 By 2005 the IRGC's
long reach into political affairs was increasingly apparent. Iran's parliament included about 80 former
IRGC members, while other former members command the regular army and the national police. Still
more occupy important civilian and government positions, such as municipal councilors, mayors,
provincial governors, university professors, and businessmen. 160 Through examination of the various
facets of the Pasdaran, it is evident its elements work under an ideological veil, but truly have both
political and economic stakes in maintaining and defending the current regime.

Although ideological by design, many in the Pasdaran have assumed roles within its ranks in
order to simply acquire a paycheck. Most distinguished Pasdaran commanders can be viewed as
businessmen, with the distinction as a military figure being merely a ceremonial role. A majority of the
members have relatives abroad in Europe or North America in order to safeguard business interests and
maintain congress with foreign “satans” should Tehran eventually fall in an ideological sense. Those
Pasdaran commanders who found themselves unable to embrace the Islamic Republic's rigid practices
defected to America. Hundreds of others relegated themselves to a low-profile exile, for the most part as
businessmen in the UAE, Malaysia and Turkey. Contrary to popular sentiments in the partisan media,
few Pasdaran commanders, including some in the highest of offices, abhor the notion of hostile relations
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with America. Should the Pasdaran be forced to engage American troops a true military victory is highly
unlikely, and protracted conflict with America would damage or utterly destroy lucrative Iranian
business empires.

The term “Pasdaran” (vigilantes) evokes a mixture of loathing and grudging admiration.
Although many Iranians perceive it as a monster protecting an evil regime, most realize that Pasdaran
leaders are truly pragmatic businessmen who would ultimately side with the populace against an
increasingly repressive and unpopular clerical regime. It must be noted the Pasdaran was established
after the Islamic revolution had succeeded; a fact of crucial importance. Those who joined the Pasdaran
came from a myriad of backgrounds, many being opportunists who signed up on fictitious grounds.
Membership in the Pasdaran afforded only revolutionary credentials but, most importantly, substantial
income during a period when economic collapse made stable employment a rarity. Membership in the
Pasdaran enabled many, especially those who had supported the former regime, to erase their past and
obtain "revolutionary virginity." An Iranian who joined the Pasdaran obtained access to rare goods and
services, such as electronics and decent housing. Most importantly, the Pasdaran represented a lifeline
for many Iranians during uncertain times. For this reason, it would be irresponsible to broadly
characterize the Pasdaran as a terrorist organization. A blanket labeling of the Pasdaran (IRGC) as
"terrorist" as opposed to targeting specific elements that terrorize the Iranian people, and others in the
region and beyond, could prove counterproductive. It may, in fact, unite a fractious force that could
splinter into more manageable parts given the right incentives. 161
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

“We want good relations with the American people. There has to be a dialogue between the
governments, but what can one do when your government has always wronged us? We need to see
evidence that this process will be reversed.”

Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani – Former President of Iran

Objective examination of the status of relations between Iran and the United States invariably
leads the unbiased researcher to become somewhat critical of American foreign policy. This research
has unequivocally revealed that the United States did a great disservice to the nascent democratic forces
in Iran, beginning with the CIA lead disposal of Mossadegh. As the chief architect of American foreign
policy, U.S. presidents determine the warmth of relations with the exterior world. Examination of
foreign policy crafted by previous presidential administrations establishes that barriers to U.S. / Iranian
rapprochement are raised between the two countries at the individual level. Previous administrations
have seemingly remained fixated on the international milieu as an ideological arena characterized only
by “win or lose” outcomes. All dissonance in this realm is viewed by Washington ideologues solely
through the prism of “good versus evil” confrontation. By virtue of its wealth and military might,
Washington has claimed for itself the role as the consummate force for good. Consequently, states or
entities not firmly entrenched in Washington’s camp are characterized as enemies to be confronted and
expatriated from the international collective if they dare not acquiesce. Because Tehran has displayed
the temerity to resist Washington with increasing levels of success, Iran has been labeled as dangerous.
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During the course of my tour of the Islamic Republic, I found myself within a western oriented
country whose citizenry powerfully craves higher levels of freedom and engagement with the western
world. Although Iran is situated between two worn-torn, underdeveloped states and is besieged by
sanctions and an American containment policy, the Iranian populace is highly educated and Iran’s major
cities are modern in every sense of the word. Iranian women lead productive lives, routinely pursue
graduate level educations, and are noticeably coddled by their male counterparts. The Islamic
government, its hardliner figures, and the rigidity of the apparatus are indeed no reflection of the Iranian
society. Pro-American sentiment is rampant amongst Iranians and unlike in Iraq and Afghanistan, the
Iranian people are absolutely prepared for American style democracy.

My experience in Iran confirmed my suspicion that Washington’s history of economic sanctions
and policy of containment have been not only ineffective but also counterproductive. Evidently
Washington does not have a clear understanding of the Islamic Republic and has reacted aggressively
rather than pragmatically. Iran is a country whose younger population and future leaders are in the
majority. This up and coming segment also views the west, specifically America, quite favorably and
would welcome engagement. Iran’s economic future is also uncertain and its current political leadership
is extremely unpopular. However Washington’s lack of engagement and vilification of Iran in general
serves only to allow leaders such as Ahmadinejad to rouse nationalistic sentiment and pursue bellicose
policies. By ending hostile rhetoric and engaging Iran piecemeal across a plethora of issues, Washington
could easily garner the domestic political support necessary in Iran to occasion positive outcomes. At
this juncture, there are no longer nuclear possibilities in Iran; there are inevitabilities. The circumstances
dictate extensive engagement in order to assure the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear intentions. An
Islamic Republic engaged politically and economically with the U.S. would be certainly less inclined to
pursue a nuclear weapons program and would assist in stabilization efforts in its bordering states.
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Individual Level Implications
Eisenhower’s Legacy
A pervasive dearth of awareness with regard to the history of U.S. / Iranian relations plagues the
American populace. Mohammad Mossadegh, a colossal figure in Iranian history and Time magazine’s
1951 “Man of the Year”, and his fate at the hands of the CIA are virtually unknown in well-educated
circles of modern America. For this reason, ideologues in Washington are able to demonize Iran while
paying lip service to the notion of democracy. Not widely acknowledged is the fact that the United
States was responsible for eliminating democratic rule in Iran in 1953; subsequently installing a longstanding dictatorial regime. U.S. administration officials have been successful in vilifying Iran by
tactically elucidating particular events subsequent to the Islamic Revolution of 1979. However, it is U.S.
foreign policy prior to the Islamic Revolution that continues to stir negative Iranian sentiments.
Americans who fail to understand the Iranian animus towards Washington need only look into the
actions of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1953. By overthrowing Iran’s democratic government, the
Eisenhower Administration irrevocably changed the political culture; in effect imposing upon Iranians
the rigid elements of life they endure today. Not only were the healthy crops of democracy extirpated in
Iran, a dictatorial monarch replaced a revered political figure who embraced the United States as a
reliable sponsor and an ideological ally.

The Eisenhower Administration’s fingerprint in Iran

dramatically changed the manner in which most of the international community viewed America.
Eisenhower’s legacy is an unromantic communication from the past warning policymakers of the
dangers of effecting far-reaching changes in distant nations. For this reason, architects of American
foreign policy who seek to gain compliance from Iran must be cognizant of historical realities that have
great bearing upon the Iranian mindset. Primarily, they must refrain from repeating the mistakes of their
predecessors and avoid subordinating notions of national sovereignty and democracy to pecuniary
motives.
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Carter’s Miscalculations
There are several lessons to be learned from the miscalculations of the Carter Administration.
Although admirable, Carter’s apparent obsession with the notion of human rights veered his presidential
decision making well outside the realm of political pragmatism. Domestically, Shah Pahlavi had
alienated himself, operating a repressive dictatorial regime with a secret police force infamous for
committing acts of torture. However Pahlavi’s methods assured his regime’s foothold and had little to do
with his fall from power. Despite his despotic shortcomings, Pahlavi had normalized relations with the
West, recognized the state of Israel, and publicly accorded women equal status in Iranian society.
Because Pahlavi’s was forced make broad rather than incremental steps toward political freedom, radical
elements in Iran were left unfettered to establish a revolutionary powder keg in Iran. Carter’s subsequent
termination of funding that assuaged the enmity of outspoken anti-Western mullahs lit the match. Faced
with the choice of either backing the Shah or working with revolutionary elements to attenuate the
violence associated with transition to the new government Carter remained indecisive. After the new
revolutionary regime had come to power, Carter again allowed his humanitarian heart-strings to prevail
over pragmatism by admitting the Shah into the U.S. for medical treatment, stoking the anger of a
younger radicalized Iranian element; thus placing U.S. diplomats in Iran at their mercy. Enabled by
Carter’s humanitarian naïveté, the new regime also put thousands of so-called spies, informants, and
pro-Western Iranians to death by firing squads. Iranian women were again forced to wear conservative
attire and a once free media fell under rigid government scrutiny. A government that was once amenable
to Washington was replaced by an intractable regime utterly antagonistic towards the United States. Had
the Carter Administration not abandoned Shah Pahlavi and sought progressive change incrementally, it
is axiomatic the mullahs of Iran would not be in control today. Unfortunately for the Iranian people,
President Carter was an idealist and not a statesman. Although good intentioned, Carter failed to
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recognize Iran for the intricate political puzzle that it is. Carter’s miscalculations represent a great lesson
for future policymakers. Much like with George W. Bush’s endeavor in Iraq, presidential
administrations should consider the possible consequences associated with abruptly terminating the
repression of certain dissident elements in sovereign countries. The scheme of American freedom has
not yet proven to be universal, namely in countries where it is culturally and religiously incompatible.
Fostering abrupt widespread political freedom has more often produced violent undercurrents with
proven global implications. The forcing of Pahlavi’s hand, much like the toppling of Mossadegh and
Saddam Hussein, was not a process that had positive implications with regard to freedom and
humanitarianism. All were processes that resulted in chaotic or more repressive environments. Even in
America, progressive and enduring change occurred incrementally with leadership and the citizenry
laboring in concert with one another. The endeavor to effect positive change abroad should be an
endeavor approached with trepidation. Carter failed to consider the possible consequences his demands
would have upon the stability and continuity of governance in Iran. When confronted with their ultimate
reality, Carter was ponderously indecisive and set the stage for the emergence of the Islamic Republic of
Iran. The nascent clerical regime in Tehran and its pugnacious Shah acutely sensed Carter’s affable
nature; subsequently emboldened by their ability to flout his courteous requests with apparent impunity.
Although Pahlavi ran a repressive regime, Iran was still laboring towards democracy and Carter failed to
recognize the importance of incremental change during the course of Iran’s tumultuous political
development. The lesson in Carter’s case is that Washington should have a more thorough
understanding of the political milieu within a particular country before encouraging or compelling it to
make broad political reforms.
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Reagan’s Duplicity
Although revered amongst conservative ideologues, Reagan’s presidency will be forever
foreshadowed by two rather damaging foreign policy blunders; the arming of the Hussein regime with
chemical weapons and the Iran-Contra Affair. Siding with Hussein against Iran revealed that the Reagan
Administration evidently wished to relegate the Middle East to a globally innocuous group of warring
states incapable of resisting U.S. foreign policy endeavors. The Reagan Administration only further
alienated the U.S. from Iran and ultimately further empowered a murderous despot the United States
would itself engage militarily in the future. Furthermore, Reagan’s denial of any knowledge regarding
an Iran-Contra affair framed him as a confused and uninformed executive whose lethargic managerial
paradigm hampered his ability to control rogue subordinates. While circumventing congressional
prerogatives, the Reagan Administration operated under a majorly flawed assumption. This being the
notion that “moderate” Iranian elements somehow exercised complete control over Hezbollah. No one
can fault the Reagan Administration for attempting to negotiate with Iran in order to secure the release
of American hostages. However, the administration can be righteously castigated for over $50 million
in illegal arms sales to Iran, betrayal of the standing U.S. policy to never make concessions to terrorist
elements, and its subsequent duplicity upon the revelation of its illegal conduct. Sadly, at the end of
Reagan’s time in office, there were more kidnapped Americans in Lebanon at the end of Reagan's armsfor-hostages endeavor than there were at the outset. In retrospect, the Reagan Administration clearly
made a mistake in siding with Hussein against Iran. Additionally, Iran clearly exploited the hostage
event to its benefit. Iran evidently drew the Reagan Administration into an illicit arms deal with the
intention of eventually leaking the arrangement in order to humiliate the United States before the
international community. However, openly challenging Iran to control its proxies and waging an
effective campaign to rescue America hostages would have vitiated the Reagan Administration’s
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clandestine endeavors in Nicaragua. Coupled with the actions of his predecessors, Reagan exited office
leaving Washington with no other alternative than a reversal of America foreign policy towards Iran if it
hopes to garner a token amount of credibility in the Middle East.

George H.W. Bush’s Missed Opportunity
George H.W. Bush entered office during a period of significant change in Iran. After Khomeini’s
death, Ali Khameinei had taken the grand clerical helm and Rafsanjani had been elected as president.
Strongly aligned with the Iranian business class Rafsanjani was, and remains, antagonistic towards
Islamic ideologues in Iran such as the current president - Ahmadinejad. As a pragmatic conservative,
Rafsanjani is a domestic centrist and an international moderate who strives to avoid conflict and
improve Iran’s relations with the United States. In hindsight, Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait and
subsequent U.S. invasion of Iraq was a salient window of opportunity for George H.W. Bush to reach
out to Rafsanjani in order to pave the initial path towards rapprochement. Rafsanjani publicly
condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent U.S. invasion of Iraq; however Iran also
remained noticeably neutral as U.S. forces marched into Iraq. Bush also did well to assert publicly that
the U.S. presence in the Middle East was indeed temporary and that its forces would depart once the
Kuwaiti crisis had been averted. Although enduring a firestorm of domestic criticism for leaving
Saddam in power Bush made good on his promise. With the American objective achieved, U.S. troops
were pulled from Iraq leaving its military substantially crippled. After a decade of severed diplomatic
relations, the hostile rhetoric between Tehran and Washington had also subsided. To his defense, Bush
was also at the helm during a period when Washington’s focus was global and the U.S.S.R. was in its
death throes. However the Bush Administration seemingly ignored an opportunity to re-establish
relations with a country that, in Saddam’s weakened state, had the regional balance of power tipped in
its favor. With a common enemy hobbled, there was at this time an opportunity to engage Iran
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diplomatically in order to further contain the Hussein regime. Rafsanjani was extremely motivated to
revive Iran's badly flagging economy on the basis of free-market principles. For this reason he signaled
his desire to improve relations with the West, gradually reopen the country to foreign investment, and
reestablish Iran as a regional power. After a protracted period of soured relations, the Bush
Administration stood in a position to abandon the sticks and bring Iran galloping back into the fold with
merely a hand full of carrots. Rafsanjani's support for renewed relations with America and his freemarket economic policies stand in stark contrast with those of Ahmadinejad and his counterparts who
are absolutely unwilling to capitulate to the West. Bush’s missed opportunity with regard to the Iran of
his time brings to mind the sage advice of the Greek philosopher Heraclitus, “You could not step twice
into the same river; for other waters are ever flowing on to you.” That an opportunity was lost is not in
question. That it remains lost forever is dependent upon the ingenuity of America’s future statesmen.

Clinton’s Contrasts
It wasn’t until almost 50 years after Mossadegh’s demise that a U.S. presidential administration
formally acknowledged the great disservice the Eisenhower Administration had visited upon the people
of Iran. To his credit, President Clinton appeared to be genuinely compelled to seek reconciliation with
Iran. Clinton conceded that American officials had injudiciously deposed a democratically elected
figure, installed an authoritarian Shah, and had effectively eliminated parliamentary democracy in Iran.
Clinton’s Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, also acknowledged that the removal of Mossadegh
was a setback for Iranian political development and that it was evident that this intervention in Iran’s
internal affairs still fostered negative feelings towards America. Yet despite these conciliatory
sentiments, the demonization of Iran soared to new heights under Clinton’s watch producing two
Presidential Executive Orders (Iranian investment embargos) and the Iran-Lybia Sanctions Act (ILSA).
But why would an administration that genuinely empathized with the plight of the Iranian people
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promulgate additional sanctions that further exacerbated their predicament? Clinton faced a Republican
controlled Congress willing to accommodate well moneyed special interest groups who sought to hobble
unpopular governments such as Iran. The Clinton Administration was willing to bow to congressional
initiatives in return for support of his domestic agenda. Furthermore, sanctions were also less expensive
and not as unsavory to the Clinton Administration as foreign military intervention. The U.S. had also at
one point pressured Germany not to supply Iran with a nuclear reactor while the U.S was still importing
a substantial amount of oil from Iran. The sanctions quelled criticism from the E.U. and showed that the
U.S. was willing to operate consistently with its Iranian containment policies. Persistent pressure from
the Republican Congress, coupled with lobbying from the America-Israel Public Affairs Committee
(AIPAC) – the main Jewish lobby in Washington, also caused the Clinton Administration to act further
against Iran via ILSA.

ISLA alone has alienated the United States from some of its European allies and has neither
ended Iranian support of Palestinian groups nor ended Iran’s pursuit of nuclear development. The
Clinton Administration should have expanded upon its desire to reconcile with Iran, reminding Congress
and Americans that from a geopolitical standpoint Iran is the central cohesive element necessary for any
successful endeavor in the Middle East – as recent occurrences would prove. The Clinton
Administration might have done well to publicly side with major U.S. oil companies and assert that
active engagement, rather than containment, would yield not only economic rewards but also substantial
political dividends. President Khatami, a moderate Iranian politician, had signaled that economic
investment was the key to further political dialogue. Had trade and investment been established between
Iran and the U.S. under Clinton’s watch, political dialogue would have arguably expanded at an
exponential rate. Surely this notion is what inspired the EU to establish dialogue and bilateral relations
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with Iran in defiance of ILSA. Unfortunately, Washington once again began to fall prey to the notion of
regime change, in lieu of dialogue, as a remedy for Tehran’s defiance.

George W. Bush’s Bellicosity
By characterizing Khatami as “weak and ineffective” and signing the ILSA extension, the Bush
Administration revealed that their oil roots were no match for Washington’s hardliner elements and
AIPAC. Although the 9/11 attacks briefly transformed Iran in the Bush’s Administration’s Middle
Eastern conceptual framework, that honeymoon phase proved to be rather ephemeral in the face of
powerful special interests. Bush’s “axis of evil” rhetoric substantially hobbled moderate elements in Iran
and arguably fomented the nationalistic sentiment that swept Iranian hardliner Ahmadinejad into office.
The current stalemate between Tehran and Washington is clearly a battle of wills between ideologues on
both sides. However it is evident that both executives suffered a loss in domestic popularity as a result of
their hubris and obstinacy.

With regard to the Iranian puzzle, the Bush Administration has leaned far too heavily upon the
threat of a “military option”, which unfortunately still cannot be characterized as a successful policy in
either Afghanistan or Iraq. Ironically, intervention in Afghanistan yielded its best results when Iranian
influence was added to the equation. The Bush Administration erred greatly in snubbing the Iranians
after their benevolence during the course of the establishment of the Afghan interim government. Had
the Administration recognized its political boon and expanded Iranian involvement throughout its field
of operations in the Middle East, it could be reasonably surmised that Iran’s cultural and political
influence would have enhanced the overall efficacy of the U.S. endeavors in Iraq. The Bush
Administration should have also realized that Washington’s containment gambit had no hope of success
in a scenario where other power players such as China, the European Union, and Russia were
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successfully pursuing diplomacy and economic engagement. Washington’s economic sanctions and
military threats are clearly not succeeding due to the fact that other nations have rationally recognized
Iran’s geopolitical significance and have seen fit to draw Iran into their orbit. Iran is not the petulant
entity the Bush Administration would have had the world believe. Washington should have long ago
perceived Iran as it occurs to other world actors – a nation-state with much needed natural resources and
substantial regional clout that is equally capable of skillfully pursuing its own interests in the
international realm. With the Bush chapter fast coming to a close, there is a lesson to be learned from his
Administration’s paradigm. The re-establishment of diplomatic ties with Iran will not occur in an
atmosphere of threats or without conciliatory gestures.

In a geopolitical sense, Iran and the United States have always been natural allies pursuing the
same goals. This individual level examination has unequivocally produced a salient political imperative.
Washington must realize that Iran stands poised to play a vital role in stabilizing the Middle East. This
course of action can be realized via the reestablishment of diplomatic ties with Iran through trade,
economic engagement, and security guarantees. Rapprochement with Iran is the only logical solution to
ameliorating the current milieu of hostility.

State Level Implications
Terrorism, Iranian sponsorship of militant groups as well as their pursuit of a nuclear program
are amongst the most compelling reasons for Washington to engage in meaningful dialogue with
Tehran. The future of rapprochement with Iran should fundamentally occur in two phases. The first
being cooperation in areas of mutual concern. The second phase would involve the utilization of the
trust gained during the course of the strategic partnership to tailor undesirable Iranian conduct; namely
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its sponsorship of Palestinian resistance groups and its nuclear intentions. Examination of the matter
from this viewpoint presents a compelling argument as to why Washington and Tehran should cooperate
against the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

Terrorism
This research has revealed that Iranian influence served Washington well in Afghanistan against
the Taliban, and would have further bulwarked its efforts to curtail the actions of al-Qaeda operatives
had members of the Bush Administration elected to do so. It is important to realize that regional terrorist
organizations, such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda, are not only of concern to the United States. In addition
to Iran, their presence and actions are of extreme concern to China, India, Iraq, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey
as well as a host of other regional actors. It is important for Washington to recognize that in order to
effectively engage the Taliban and al-Qaeda it can no longer afford to pursue uni-dimensional policies.
By clinging to its ineffective containment policy, Washington unwittingly contravenes its other regional
endeavors. Iran is demonstrating that it is increasingly able to counter Washington by aligning itself with
other world powers; namely China and Russia. Additionally, Iran has recently cooperated with Turkey
against Kurdish rebel groups. By engaging and working in concert with an increasing list of U.S. allies
in areas of mutual concern, Tehran is additionally lessening the popularity of U.S. economic sanctions.
Cooperation with Iran against regional terror groups makes complete geopolitical sense. It could also
possibly lead to wider terrorism cooperatives with countries such as China and Russia that would enable
U.S. foreign policy to be conducted through mutually-reinforcing institutions.

Prior to the “axis of evil” speech, Iran willingly put aside its animus and cooperated with the
United States in Afghanistan. As a result the Taliban was deposed, al-Qaeda forces were put to rout, and
an interim democratic government was established. Now that Tehran and Washington are no longer
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cooperating, it is said that nearly half of Afghanistan is again plagued by Taliban resurgence, al-Qaeda
elements, and an aggressive militant group under the control of radical Islamic leader Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar. Cooperation with Iran lead to success after September 11th and arguably further success
could be realized via active re-engagement. Iran’s cultural and political influence clearly had a
stabilizing effect in Afghanistan. Therefore it stands to reason that rapprochement would visit the same
results in Lebanon, Iraq, the Persian Gulf, and quite possibly the broader Middle East. Iran and the
United States have common enemies – the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Continued friction between Tehran
and Washington only weakens their regional effectiveness and benefits their common enemies. As
posited by noted Iran scholar Rouhollah K. Ramazani, an American-Iranian partnership against al-Qaeda
will not signal the end to Iraqi or Afghani problems. However, such collaboration will be a vital move
towards stabilizing both countries, a vision desired by reasonable people worldwide.162

Revolution Exportation
Although Tehran clearly cooperated with Washington to depose the Taliban and engage alQaeda elements in Afghanistan, its actions earned it no relief from incessant U.S. claims that it actively
sponsors state terrorism. Tehran’s support of militant groups, namely Hezbollah, is largely explained by
its perception of its geostrategic milieu. In addition to supporting Hezbollah for ideological and
humanitarian reasons, Tehran has utilized Hezbollah as a tool to confront external elements that it
perceives as a national security threat; specifically Israel and the United States.

With no expectation of peace in the Middle East on the horizon, coupled with calls for “regime
change” from Washington, Tehran logically perceives it is facing the peril of military confrontation. In
the face of U.S. sanctions and hostile rhetoric, the Islamic Republic will not likely alter its current
relationship with Hezbollah. Additionally, Iran is currently experiencing a salient strategic quandary. It
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is beset on its northern and southern borders by an ardent wall of U.S. occupation with Israel nearby; a
reality that surely exacerbates Tehran’s ever-growing perception of being under siege by Washington.

Although labeled a terrorist organization, Hezbollah is nowhere near the destructive threat that
al-Qaeda represents. Furthermore, radical figureheads such as Usama bin Laden have clearly
demonstrated their bellicose and uncompromising natures. Conversely, leaders in Hezbollah have
expressed a willingness to compromise and possibly commit to an Israeli-Syrian-Lebanese peace
agreement. Hezbollah’s increasing efficacy also does not emanate from its paramilitary nature.
Hezbollah has achieved prominence and stability by functioning as a political and social welfare
organization as well. This evolution has allowed Hezbollah to ultimately occupy a conventional role in
Lebanese politics.

As Tehran perceives that it is under threat, it is unlikely that the Islamic Republic will consider
altering the fundamental nature of its support to Hezbollah. However, as of April 2005 Iran had
systematically removed virtually all of its forces from Lebanon. Additionally, even if Iran discontinued
all financial and logistical support Hezbollah would not cease to exist. As a social welfare organization
and a political party, Hezbollah has moderated its militant Islamic orientation enabling itself to seek
longevity as a member of the Lebanese political arena. Hezbollah and Iran have also broadened their
political relationships in Lebanon. This evolving relationship suggests rather clearly that Hezbollah is no
longer seeking to mimic Iran’s establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon. Overall, Iran’s
relationships in Lebanon are more of an endeavor to seek an accommodating neighbor rather than the
exportation of its revolution. By ending its antagonistic projections of power and limiting its
involvement in Lebanon to diplomatic engagement, Iran has demonstrated that it is prepared to play a
constructive role in the Middle East peace process.
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Nuclear Power
Evidently it is not common knowledge in America that Iran is among the 189 signatories of the
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into force in 1970; indefinitely extended in 1995.
Among the three major “pillars” of the NPT is the right of signatory states to peacefully utilize nuclear
technology. In addition to discouraging the development of nuclear weapons it also requires nations to
reduce their nuclear weapon stockpiles. Ironically, while demonizing Iran for its nuclear endeavors the
United States is currently in violation of the reduction provision of the NPT. That Washington has
refused to engage Iran in any form of direct negotiations with regard to its nuclear ambitions is surely
the impetus for Tehran’s 2005 declaration to remain undeterred in exercising its right to enrich uranium
for peaceful purposes.

Washington’s double standard of criticizing Iran's nuclear program while tolerating Israel’s
possession of nuclear weapons also prevents it from vilifying Iranian conduct with any modicum of
legitimacy. Known to possess nuclear weapons with the ability to deploy them by air, land and sea,
Israel has also labored diplomatically, militarily, and covertly to forestall other regional actors from
developing nuclear capabilities. Despite its policy of nuclear opacity Israel has yet to be targeted with
the same vitriol as Iran. Situated in a region that is fundamentally at odds with it, Israel has logical
reasons for pursuing nuclear capabilities. However, it is an equally rational endeavor for Tehran to
pursue capabilities that effectively counterbalance those of whom they perceive as a hostile neighbor.
Clearly Tehran initially concealed its uranium enrichment activities. However, unlike Israel, Iran is a
signatory state of the NPT that agreed not to pursue nuclear weapons development and has committed
itself to full cooperation and transparency with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
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Although nuclear technology will not completely resolve Iran’s energy issues, it apparently
pursues nuclear technology also for security and the prestige associated with such an accomplishment.
Tehran’s pursuit of nuclear development is intimately intertwined with its need for security. Not only is
Iran situated close to a nuclear Israel, it has been routinely assailed by notions of “regime change” by a
powerful country whose armed forces have deposed the ruling regimes in neighboring states.
Allegations of a dangerous weapons program served as the justification for the elimination of the
Hussein regime in Iraq. Similar accusations have been made against the clerical regime in Iran, therefore
it is rather apparent why its leaders have embraced an unyielding stance on the nuclear issue.

This research suggests that Washington must accept the inevitability of a nuclear Iran. Had
Washington expanded upon the success experienced during the course of working together with Iran in
Afghanistan, there might have been a chance to discourage Iran from uranium enrichment altogether.
However, that opportunity no longer exists. At this point, direct engagement of Iran by Washington in
order to assure the peaceful purposes of its nuclear program may be viewed askance by Tehran.
Washington would better serve its interests by working in concert with its European allies to tailor the
Iranian nuclear program while offering incentives such as technological / economic assistance, and most
importantly the incremental lifting of sanctions.

System Level Implications
A recurring notion throughout this paper is that Iran and the United States are very much natural
allies in the Middle East making the diplomatic chill all the more politically irrational. Paradoxically,
Tehran and Washington find themselves common enemies of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, as well as the
most steadfast foreign supporters of the Kurdish-Shi’ite political axis that surfaced in the post-invasion
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Iraqi government. It remains undeniable that Washington and Tehran are very much strategic allies with
respect to Afghanistan and Iraq. Furthermore, Iran stands poised to play a crucial stabilizing role within
its own neighborhood. The mutual pursuit of regional stability is also an endeavor threatened by illicit
narcotics. The trafficking of illicit narcotics remains one of the most serious threats to the stability and
security of Afghanistan being that they are a primary funding source for the re-emerging Taliban. Opium
emanating from Afghanistan has caused a serious addiction crisis in Iran, and according to the U.S.
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) may ultimately fill the void created by successful poppy eradication
endeavors in Mexico and South America. Finally, Washington has created yet another problem for itself
by its blanket labeling of the Pasdaran (IRGC) as a terrorist organization. It is clear that the Pasdaran
was initially founded to safeguard the integrity of the Iranian Islamic establishment and prevent a
military coup. However the Pasdaran has morphed into a huge military and economic conglomerate,
with tentacles reaching into all the major state organizations. It has also widely integrated itself into
Iran’s oil industry, construction, and other key sectors. Yet, its compartmentalized aspect represents an
opportunity for Washington to moderate Iran incrementally via economic engagement. This final
examination at the system level elucidates the necessity for Washington to engage Iran economically
and politically in order to realize some of the more important goals of the modern age. What stands to be
gained is the attenuation of regional insurgency in the Middle East, an ally in the global war on drugs,
and the end of hostility between Washington and Tehran through engagement of some of the less
ideological components of the Iranian Islamic apparatus.

Afghanistan / Iraq
This research clearly indicates that Iran’s assistance is vital in the reestablishment of stability
within Afghanistan and Iraq. Not one of Afghanistan’s or Iraq’s neighboring states have demonstrated
that they are as willing and effective as the Islamic Republic has been before and during the course of
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the U.S. presence in the Middle East. Both countries are well within the orbit of Iranian influence with
Washington acutely sensing it during the course of the U.S. occupations. Iran has and continues to
maintain a strong political and economic presence in southern Afghanistan. By virtue of an 8-year war
with Iraq and an enduring religious connection with its Shi’ite inhabitants, Iran is also quite familiar
with the political landscape and its actors as well. As coreligionists, the Shi’ite populations of both
countries routinely look upon Iran with a more favorable disposition than their other neighbors. Tehran’s
political and religious influence in both states is grander in significance than its alleged interference that
is supposedly hampering Washington’s military and political efficacy. Despite all the hostile rhetoric,
Iran avidly seeks to assume its rightful role in the stabilization of its neighboring states. Further
obstinacy on Washington’s part will surely exacerbate the milieu of violence and instability plaguing
these besieged states.
Ironically, despite the lingering animus, the U.S. led invasions and subsequent occupations of
Afghanistan and Iraq are a boon to Iran. Iran’s ominous security threats, the Taliban and Saddam
Hussein, were removed from power at no expense to Tehran. However, the time has come for
Washington to change its strategy and align itself with one of the most important players in the region –
Iran. Prudence dictates that the roadmap to success in the arena of regional stability and an enduring
peace involves Tehran’s influence. Washington, as well as the American taxpayer, can no longer afford
to ignore the region’s most important power player. Much like its allies, Washington must pragmatically
engage Tehran directly in pursuit of mutual goals. This by no means suggests that Washington must
countenance an Iran armed with nuclear weapons. Simply stated, active dialogue and cooperation in
areas of mutual concern will serve to attenuate the milieu of antagonism and open the door to
negotiations on more controversial matters.
The suggested change in Washington’s regional strategy is not a form of surrender or retreat as
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posited by certain political theorists. It is merely the recognition of salient regional realities. From a
logical standpoint, Washington simply has no other viable alternative; a notion Iran must be increasingly
aware of. Two major regional realities with regard to Iran’s significance in regional affairs have
elucidated the impractical nature of Washington’s current policies. The first being the Karzai
government’s routine highlighting of Iran’s stabilizing hand in Afghanistan. The second being the alMaliki government (Iraq) calling for an expansion of security talks between Washington and Tehran.
Stable governance and the absence of violence in both Afghanistan and Iraq is the key to regional
stability. Therefore it can be reasonably surmised that this goal can be realized via an alteration of
American foreign policy towards Iran.
The Iranian containment policy clearly impedes some of Washington’s most important regional
endeavors. By abandoning such tactics and recognizing Iran as a worthy regional player to be
pragmatically engaged, Washington will surely realize a plethora of short and long-term goals. By
drawing Iran into the mix, American and Iranian interests in Iraq and Afghanistan will no longer be
perceived to be in opposition to one another. Should all major goals be realized, it would also ultimately
facilitate the graceful extraction of U.S. military forces from the region as well. No matter what course
of action Washington elects to pursue in the short-term, the turmoil within Iraq and Afghanistan will
ultimately dragoon Washington into negotiations with Iran. It is then that Washington will finally
recognize Iran’s legitimacy as a regional player, which shares numerous mutual regional concerns. Over
time this cooperation will pave the road to constructive negotiation over Iran’s nuclear intentions and
establish a broader framework within which the historical discord between Tehran and Washington can
be effectively mitigated.
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War on Drugs
There has been a paucity of success in the abatement of the enormous opium crop in southern
Afghanistan, a location still menaced by a resurgent Taliban. This research has shown that despite the
presence of American troops in Afghanistan, opium production has increased exponentially. The
smuggling of opium into Iran is the first leg of a journey that ferries the drug to Western markets.
Currently, Afghanistan produces the bulk of the global opium supply and approximately half of this
supply flows through Iran. This reality would make cooperation with Iran in the war on Afghani opium
exports mutually rewarding.

Because thousands of Iranian police have perished during the course of violent confrontations
with armed drug traffickers, there is substantial evidence that Iran is somewhat committed to stemming
the flow of drug from Afghanistan into its land and beyond. The west has also found it extremely
difficult to abate opium farming in remote areas of Afghanistan due in large part to the Taliban, who
finances their operations via taxation of opium farmers. Cooperation with Iran in the area of opium
abatement would ultimately align Washington and Tehran against a common enemy – the Taliban. If
Washington also administered economic and material aid to Iran during the course of its domestic battle
against drugs, that aid could also be used as leverage to tailor Tehran’s policies in other areas. Currently,
unilateral sanctions prevent Washington from providing Iran aid in its battle against drugs. However
several European states continue to contribute aid via the United Nations in this regard. Although
millions have been raised by European states to assist Iran in its domestic battle against drug trafficking,
that amount still represents a mere fraction of what the United States has invested into Afghanistan in
order to discourage opium farming. Despite Washington’s substantial investments since 2001, opium
production has proliferated. The current administration’s “go it alone” approach has proved not only to
be ineffective but also overwhelmingly expensive.
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The war on illicit narcotics is a global affair and can’t be effectively addressed without
international cooperation. By operating through multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations,
Washington would arguably realize numerous goals at a substantially discounted rate. Cooperation with
Tehran in this regard, as well as many others, is neither an admission of defeat nor a special favor. Such
cooperation would facilitate the accomplishment of a plethora of Washington’s regional goals and set
the stage for amicable negotiations on more controversial matters.

The Taliban had previously proscribed opium production in Afghanistan. However, due to the
U.S. led invasion the Taliban and opium production have now become intimately intertwined. Opium
farming has become the livelihood of farmers in remote areas of Afghanistan. The Taliban in turn taxes
opium farmers and utilizes the proceeds to finance its resistance against the military occupation and the
new Afghan government. This nexus demands both a comprehensive and multilateral approach with Iran
as one of the main protagonists. If Washington singlehandedly focuses upon poppy eradication in
Afghanistan it risks uniting the farmers and other fractious elements with the Taliban, making the
contentment of this state next to impossible.

Yet, research suggests that counter-narcotics operations are a regional affair and not a business
Washington should directly involve itself it. Washington should limit itself to economic and material
support while focusing primarily upon engaging the mutual enemy – the Taliban. By providing
economic and material support to Kabul and Tehran in their battle against the narcotic apparatus,
Washington will enable them to engage a network that finances the Taliban insurgency. As a benefactor
in the regional war on drugs, Washington will enable itself to focus more upon one if its primary goals –
the elimination of the Taliban insurgency.
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Pasdaran
As indicated previously, the Pasdaran was established as a security measure for the purposes of
defending the ideological purity of the Islamic Republic. However, abreast of the Pasdaran is a
correlative economic base which enabled the organization to become financially independent. The
Pasdaran’s ability to forgo state funding also allows it to remain committed to its objectives despite any
changes in the country’s political hierarchy. The Pasdaran’s tentacles of influence have continued to
entrench themselves deeper as former operatives retired from military offices to become business men
and members of the state bureaucracy. The intimate nexus between the state bureaucratic apparatus,
business community, and military-police forces have in essence afforded the Pasdaran a modicum of
domestic sovereignty. The Pasdaran’s financial and political ascendency stems from its substantial
holdings and a plexus of internal relations within Iran. A conglomerate of sorts, the Pasdaran has
become a redoubtable economic and political force to be reckoned with in Iran.

This research suggests a nexus between Washington’s growing criticism of Iran, namely the
Pasdaran, and its Sunni allies alarm regarding the anchoring of Shi’a influence in Iraq. Arguably Saudi
Arabia is concerned about the security and political vacuum resulting from the U.S. lead invasion which
has created an opportunity for Iran to gain a larger regional foothold. It is becoming increasingly
apparent the Pasdaran has sponsored armed Shi’a elements in Iraq in order to afford these elements a
significant advantage over the opposition, which for the most part are Sunni factions. Rather than
confronting the American military directly, the Pasdaran has pragmatically elected to empower Shi’a
Arabs in Iraq. In doing so, Iranian elements are focusing upon a post-occupation scenario where its
history of support will surely garner substantial political dividends. Its history of involvement in
Afghanistan, Lebanon, Bosnia, and work with dissident groups in Iraq reveals the Pasdaran is adept at
working through proxies in order to occasion regional goals. Washington’s blanket labeling of the
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Pasdaran is an overt signal to its Sunni partners that American politicos are committed to confronting the
regional projection of Iranian influence.

Earlier in this paper a salient similarity was explored with the historic conduct of the CIA and
Iran’s Pasdaran. In the past and post 9/11, Washington has reserved for itself the right to preempt
perceived threats. On the basis of this rationale, Washington has legitimized its support of rebel
elements that attack regimes it has deemed to be unacceptable. However, for essentially the same
regional conduct the Pasdaran earned for itself a terrorist label and for Iran a role in President Bush’s
infamous “axis of evil.” There is no question that the Pasdaran has trained and provided arms to regional
elements such as Hezbollah and militant Shi’a groups in Iraq. However, is this different than the Reagan
Administration’s support of the brutal military in El Salvador or the Contra Rebels in Nicaragua? In the
course of comparing the killers of non-combatants to America’s founding fathers President Reagan
stated, “I am Contra too.” Reagan’s conduct, although in the interest of freedom, national security, and
national interests in the arena of anti-communism is clearly analogous to Iran’s regional conduct. In
essence, an accomplice to the deaths of thousands of South American non-combatants, has Washington
too not earned itself the “sponsor of terrorism” label as well?

Ironically, Tehran’s willingness to embrace U.S. backed regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq has in
no way altered the current U.S. presidential administration’s proclivity to vilify Iran and designate the
Pasdaran as a terrorist organization. Despite Washington’s benevolence and continued endeavors to
contain Iran, Tehran has still managed to establish cozy relations with its neighboring nascent regimes.
Washington’s terrorist label is clearly an attempt to posit the Pasdaran is analogous to al Qaeda;
however such a notion clearly lacks any modicum of intellectual lucidity. Additionally, such rationale
would earn the United States the same designation several times over. Both callow and simplistic, this
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worldview reflects no true understanding of global realities and threatens to unite fractious regional
elements against the current American military presence in the Middle East. Washington’s labeling of
the Pasdaran clearly threatens to push militant elements of Iraq and the Pasdaran closer together which
would guarantee more violent attacks against American troops.

Closing Statement
This paper is certainly not an indictment of America and goes well beyond the scope of political
diatribe in that it proffers political solutions supported by a growing amount of specialists in the foreign
policy establishment. It is additionally not uncommon for a policy piece to focus criticism upon political
leadership, past and present, as well as the forces that govern their decision-making. Failed policies, such
as the CIA engineered 1953 coup, were discussed in depth as they are completely relevant to the current
state of affairs between Tehran and Washington today. Many who support the notion of regime change in
Iran are completely unaware that Iran was in fact a budding democracy at one point in history. It is
undeniable that Washington’s intervention in Iran eliminated democracy and nurtured a dictatorship
which later occasioned the rigid theocratic government that exists today. Sadly, almost an unknown in
modern political circles, Mohammed Mossadegh is a colossal figure in the realm of democracy.
However, Mossadegh was fated with the temerity to assert that his country’s natural resources were the
sovereign property of the Iranian people at a time when certain global powers felt otherwise. The 1953
coup not only settled a battle over natural resources, it ended the Iranian people’s fight to win their
independence and craft their own foreign policy.
This piece has been authored at a time when the Bush Administration is aggressively prosecuting
its notion of “democracy promotion” in the Middle East, calling for “regime change” to wrest political
power from the hands of the “un-elected few”. However this comes as a hard sell to objective political
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observers and Iranians who are aware that Washington’s past intervention in Iran crushed its nascent
democracy with dictatorial consequences. With history as a guide, it is evident there must a long-term
strategy employed by the United States, in concert with other state actors, which diplomatically
encourages Iran to evolve. It has become increasingly obvious that sanctions, containment strategies, and
threats have only empowered Iranian radicals and undermined diplomacy. By encouraging Iran to focus
upon mutual interests, Washington could certainly lessen Iran’s focus upon nuclear enrichment for
military applications and moderate its leadership’s stance towards the state of Israel.
Certainly misperception has played a role with Iran’s complex political culture being among the
leading causes. As indicated in the first chapter of this paper, Iran is a complex challenge Washington
must first face by first learning and questioning. With many strategic interests in common, Washington
currently has the opportunity to pragmatically re-conceive its relationship with Tehran. Washington is
also no stranger to the notion of taking the lead to pursue rapprochement with its previous foes. The
situation with Iran calls for a similar strategy employed by President Nixon resulting in the Shanghai
Communiqué. As it was with China in 1972, so is it in the interest of the global community for the
United States and Iran to work towards the normalization of their relations for the purposes of
prosecuting a successful campaign against modern issues such as the war on drugs and transnational
terrorism. The subsequent expansion of cultural and economical relations would arguably lead to
compromise on the nuclear issue as well. It is evident this paper argues for nothing more than what has
yielded ample success for American statesmen in the past.

“To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”
Sun Tzu 163
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